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Directors of rural cooperatives face diverse demands. They must 
diÎTSC't COO'O0T2.tI2.V'0 SCCOrdîH^  to "OTOVisi-OPS 2.T 
cooperative's articles of incorporation and bylaws. They must control 
the current operation of the cooperative and set future policy goals. 
As representatives elected by members, they must communicate with their 
member-constituency and with management. They must also communicate 
with external audiences that may hold different values. Board responsi­
bilities are diverse and board decisions affect the cooperative in the 
short and the long term. 
Despite the amount of responsibility delegated to cooperative 
1 ^  f- f" "1 c Vn r»T.m 3^  f-T-» A civt'o-o't- 4- n T.TV» ^  f-Tn air 
change or about the special challenges to board decision making in 
uncertain contexts. The lack of information about boards stems, in 
part, from the "... mystique of the inner sanctums of the corporate 
enterprise" (Garoyan and Mohn, 1976:1). The task is complicated by the 
wide latitude that boards have in form and function. Boards vary in 
structure, composition, behavior and size and individual directors have 
different objectives, economic orientations and values (Garoyan and 
This research was undertaken in order to fulfill the requirements 
of a graduate internship in applied sociology. The applied goal was to 
provide a descriptive profile of members of the boards of directors of 
Iowa cooperatives to the Executive Director of the Iowa Institute of 
Cooperation, a state cooperative coordinating council. The Executive 
Director hoped that information might also be gained that would help 
-The Iowa State University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects 
in Research reviewed this project and concluded that the rights and 
welfare of the human subjects were adequately protected, that risks were 
outweighed by the potential benefits and expected value of the knowledge 
sought, that confidentiality of data was assured and that informed 
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directors cope with constant change. Thus, on a general level, the 
research problem was to provide descriptive information about coopera­
tive directors and to suggest procedures, based on this research, by 
which boards of directors might cope with ongoing change. 
Aitotlier goal of the internship was to apply scciclogical concepts 
and propositions to the research problem. In sociological terms, the 
problem was to determine directors' perceptions of and strategies for 
coping with an uncertain and rapidly changing environment. An overriding 
concern is the extent to which a grass roots organization such as a 
cooperative, a locally owned and managed institution, is able to thrive, 
or even survive, in this day and age. The sociological question to be 
addressed is: How can organizations such as cooperatives have autonomy 
and make quality decisions in a world made uncertain for them by extra-
local forces? 
Applied Relevance 
All stages of the research project were designed to fulfill the 
applied objective of providing information to the sponsor of the intern­
ship. Yet, within this constraint, sociological concepts, methods and 
theories were to be utilized. While these two objectives are not mutu­
ally exclusive, the applied objective did take precedence. 
The approach taken was to let the applied objectives dictate the 
selection of theoretical perspectives. Three perspectives which might 
be used to study rural coopératives and their boards of directors were 
selected on the basis of what they might contribute to the research prob­
lem. The first, the decision making perspective, is perhaps the most 
common approach to studying beards of directors. The second, the 
resource dependence approach—s variation of exchange theory—has been 
employed in the last decade with some success. The third approach, 
population ecology, has not been used to study boards of directors but 
does show promise as an approach to the study of groups of organizations 
such as cooperatives. Its implications for cooperatives also have 
relevance for boards of directors. 
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Each of these perspectives and the research reported here may con­
tribute to a "theory of cooperatives for the 1980s"—a need delineated 
by a task force evaluating the cooperatives' program of the Economics, 
Statistics and Cooperatives Service (Edick et al., 1980). This evalua­
tion group consists largely of nonacademic professioaals employed by 
cooperatives or ancilliary organizations. That such a group would advo­
cate the development of such a theory is evidence that the gap between 
theory and its application will not only be bridged but that the bridge 
will also benefit both the sociologist and the practitioner. Thus, while 
there may be some rift between theory and data in the present research, 
the conclusions and implications drawn and the suggestions offered for 
future research are offered in the spirit of an ongoing dialogue between 
the theoretical and practical aspects of research on cooperatives and 
their boards of directors. 
Dissertation Overview 
The purpose of this research is to contribute theoretical and 
empirical information about boards of directors. A natural selection 
model of organizational change is presented in Chapter II. Three per­
spectives which may be integrated by this model are briefly reviewed; 
population ecology, rational decision making and resource dependence. 
The population ecology approach is assumed to be mere general and thus 
subsume the resource dependence and decision making perspectives. Ways 
ill which the population acclcgy approach complements the other f-c 
and might strengthen further research are stressed. Effort is made to 
select what is best from each perspective. 
Key theoretical concepts are then presented: (1) environmental 
uncertainty and its components—perception, environment and uncertainty; 
(2) boundary spanning activities, especially organizational linkages; 
(3) traditionalism; and (4) organization form and structure, including 
size, type and age of cooperative and continuity of management. Several 
theoretical prepositions are developed from these concepts which may be 
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In the third chapter, the study background is reviewed, the method­
ological procedures are discussed and the theoretical concepts are 
operationalized. Empirical data about the directors of two types of 
rural cooperatives are presented in the fourth chapter. These data were 
obtained from a survey of the directors and managers of 117 Iowa coopera­
tives. The data are used to test several propositions concerning the 
relationship between two measures of environmental uncertainty and (1) 
individual and organizational linkages, (2) competition, (3) traditional­
ism and (4) organizational type and structure. Next, organizational level 
data are used to examine correlates of organizational level linkages. 
Additional concepts used include age of cooperative and tenure of the 
cooperatives' managers. 
The implications of the study are discussed in the final chapter. 
Ways in which an ecological approach might strengthen a cross-sectional 
study such as this are delineated. Specific suggestions for future 
research on boards of directors are set forth including a model into 
which the results of this and future studies might be incorporated. 
These suggestions are viewed as a means of developing a "theory of 
cooperatives" for the 1980s as proposed by Edick et al. (1980). Such 
a theory would undoubtedly need to be comprehensive and to incorporate, 




Competing theoretical perspectives differ in the credit given indi­
vidual decisions and deliberace organizaLioaal strategies in influencing 
organizational change. Three perspectives of organizational change are 
examined in this review: population ecology, resource dependence and 
rational decision making. Advocates of each perspective emphasize 
different units of analysis, time frames and sources of variation. 
These differences are not easy to reconcile. Debate continues 
because of (Karpik, 1978:1,2): 
. . . the absence of any manifestly superior interpretive model, 
the particular difficulties of empirical study, and the even 
match of contending forces within the scientific community. 
However, theoretical diversity is an asset—evidence of science at work 
(Karpik, 1978:1,2). One must determine under what conditions each per­
spective has the greatest explanatory power. As pointed out by Hage 
(1978:138,9):  
It does not pay to spend much time arguing for one or another 
intellectual perspective—for example, is structural-functional-
ism worse than conflict theory—but instead to use both perspec­
tives in attempting to analyze some problem. . . . Likewise the 
question is not whether organizational sociology qua science or 
qua history is better but whether their combination is likely to 
have the most intellectual pay-off. 
In the present study, three perspectives are applied. It is assumed 
that all three may be subsumed under a more general model. 
A General Model 
The three perspectives may be viewed as variants of a general model 
in which a process of natural selection triggers organizational change 
(Aldrich, 1979:27-31). This model offers a way of integrating research 
from various theoretical traditions and forces the investigator to deal 
with the societal context within which organizations are created, sur­
vive or fail, and rise to prominence or sink into obscurity (Aldrich, 
1979:xii). According to CampDeii 1196%:73), organizacions evolve in 
6 
the direction of better fit with the environment in three stages: 
1. The occurrence of variations, planned or unplanned. 
2. The selection of some variations over others, whether selective 
elimination, propagation or retention. 
O .  XÛC J L  C UCLl C VJL J. L.X V V 0.1. JL <3. U J. UHO WLiCJ.CU_y UiiCÎJ' 
are preserved, duplicated or reproduced. 
Natural selection is a general model which is used to explain the process 
of change in all living systems. While typically applied to biological 
evolution, its relevance to organizations has recently become more widely 
appreciated. 
This general model is being utilized because many questions of 
interest in organizational sociology require a theoretical perspective 
that takes account "not only the internal structure of organizations but 
also the forces in their environments that set limits to organizational 
discretion" (Aldrich, 1979:1). This model is thus compatible with the 
research problem of determining whether local cooperatives can maintain 
organizational autonomy and whether their directors can make quality 
decisions in an environment made uncertain for them by extra-local 
forces. 
The occurrence of variations—the raw material of natural selec­
tion—is the first stage in the natural selection process. The greater 
the heterogeneity and number of variations among a population of organi­
zations, the greater the chance for a close fir with the environment 
modes of behavior by innovating organizations, as well as the creation 
of new organizations, may introduce variation into a population. Pri­
mary sources of variation among rural cooperatives would include innova­
tion and the creation of new organizations through either merger or 
consolidation. Variations need not be conscious; random or unplanned 
1976:87) .  
U-W v.-W ^ ^ i-iv-iO U LV C U C-O Cil L. ^ ^ c:. V ^ j_ — C-L. V-/^ 
(Aldrich and Pfeffer. 1976:88): a high rate ('numerous instances"; of 
o P 'r-i-irrVs vpt-o mrN-v-f-ol-i-f-TT T r\ v Tno 
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rate of cooperatives is well documented (Schaars, 1971:84; Knapp, 1973). 
Although environmental selection usually refers to the selective survival 
or elimination of complete organizations, in the case of cultural evolu­
tion it also applies to parts of organizations (Campbell, 1969:74; 
Aldrich, 1979:44). The utility of the pure natural selection model tor 
organizations is limited, but less complete forms of selection may exist 
for all organizations. 
Retention of organizational form depends on the transmission of 
knowledge or structure across generations, often via the material cul­
ture. The preservation of organizational form may be achieved in 
several ways (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976:96). For example, in a bureau­
cracy, documents and files provide a material record of past practices. 
Specialization and standardization of duties limit the discretion of 
office holders and protect organizations against random variations from 
policy. Centralized authority, a stable selection and promotion system, 
role socialization and ideology also preserve organizational form and 
character. Small, local cooperatives are gensrall]." net highly bureau-
cratized nor especially complex in their structure. Rentention of form 
in these organizations results largely from the centralized authority of 
the manager and the traditional ideology to which members adhere. 
External retention mechanisms include the environmental demands that 
rr-i-oa i i TT c<o I <3 r* f- A M -"-hio -f- 4 f- T TTA Tn arm — 
sures and political pressures (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1576:98). Such a 
mechanism may promote or inhibit organizational adaptation. 
Three Perspectives 
Aldrich (1979) applies the natural selection model to three per-
a y c V. V ju V C.O - cio c& y VA u. c; i ; a. u o .u o c: c: v_ — 
C: U/ Ckis-LCit CkO .i. i. iC-. v_ v_k C. a. O w u. k-^ V./1 
making as rational selection. This integrating framework elucidates the 
key elements and contrasts between the perspectives and provides the 
basis for a multi-perspective approach to boards of directors of cooper­
atives in uncertain environments. Before specifically examining the 
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points of contrast and the way in which each part relates to the general 
model, each perspective will be briefly reviewed. 
The Population Ecology Perspective 
The population ecology perspective advances a strong argument for 
the primacy of the environment as a determinant of organizational struc­
ture. According to this perspective, environments select those organi­
zational forms and activities that best fit environmental characteris­
tics. Organizations with structures that fit environmental requirements 
are more likely to survive. 
Ecology typically views communities as functional organizations of 
populations in the process of achieving and maintaining adaptation to an 
environment. More recently, ecology has been used to explain the form 
that organizations assume in response to varying demographic, technolog­
ical and environmental pressures (Hannon and Freeman, 1977). 
The ecological model emphasizes the external control of organiza­
tions. In this model (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1975:102), the "role of 
decision making and choice is downplayed and the possibility that people 
shape . . . their environment is ignored." Individual perceptions and 
decisions are no more likely than luck, chance and random and unplanned 
events to induce organizational change. The model does not deny the 
instead to a more balanced viewpoint (Aldrich, 1979:22,23): "How, under 
T.TT-I n CT>o/^ -î-r-î/* OT^ TrT'*-/-\r^ mOT^ 't~o Î30 /I c 
individuals, the driving force underlying organizational change?" Some 
despite poor management. 
ogy model differs from traditional explanations of organizational 
change: 
First, it focuses on the nature and distribution of resources in 
cArgoiij-Zg.uILons snvxircnirisnus ss uiiG Cciiuirsj. zn 
rather than on internal leadership or participation in decision 
making. Second, it examines organizations as representatives of 
rvnes found in DO?ulacions consisrine of hundreds and often 
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thousands of other organizations, thus using an aggregate as 
opposed to an individual level of analysis. Third, it takes 
into account the historical context within which organizations 
emerge, paying particular attention to political and economic 
conditions. Finally, the population ecology model re-estab­
lishes the link between organizational sociology and the 
general analysis of social organization that was weakened in 
the decades following World War II. 
The population ecology model is ideally applied to populations of organi­
zations, existing over time, with numerous variations. 
Little organizational research has utilized the pure natural selec­
tion—or population ecology—model. Some work consists of economic 
studies of long range changes in industrial composition and theoretical 
discussions of the effects of competition and financial constraints on 
firms' internal decisions (Starbuck, 1975:1105). Stinchcombe (1965) 
also approached organizations from an evolutionary perspective. In 
addition, some elements of structural contingency theory are compatible 
with an evolutionary or ecological theory (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976). 
Although ecological axplanaticns add an historical, developmental 
dinension to organizational analysis, the model is under-utilized because 
longitudinal data, necessary for an adequate test, is often unavailable. 
Furthermore, its applicability is complicated by the role of the govern­
ment and by the size of the organization(s) under study (Aldrich, 1979: 
2 t 9 Mir-i n-n;3T-\7 rnPOT^ v ptp 
often tautological. However, when ecological explanations are not suffi-
< ai-, +- -f-r^ o^ T mo-.r e i t-n'-s 1 c.m o-n o-f-T-on cr-f-Vi o-n "no TQn o n't" "7 » 
The Decision Making Perspective 
The decision making perspective focuses on environments as seen by 
organizational members. Emphasis is placed on perceptions and cogni­
tion. Environments are viewed as enacted or created through a process 
of accencion and bounded by members' perceptions of the flow of informa­
tion (Weick, 1969: Child, 1972). The environment consists of informa-
 ^ •->  ^y. -V" 4 .ri  ^ V» fc-s*» o V* 4— -I /-^  +— *V~ I S '  ^ •>" IV>J/W*S fill L. JL V/ 11 ^ CI i. Ci W OL \_ l_ Wit L/ J» O Vw i. i. ^  -i. V. C» J- O 4 ^  ^  y • 
makers no main Lain o c iMui: 1 f v ur^anizaciunaz structures and aciixViti-cS 
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(Aldrich, 1979:122). Areas of research include decision processes 
within organizations, the conditions under which information is perceived 
and interpreted by participants, and the impact of uncertainty on the 
ability of organizational members to make decisions and restructure their 
organizations to cope with uncertainty. The issue of perceptions of 
uncertainty by organizational actors is a crucial issue which will be 
addressed in depth during the presentation of theoretical concepts. 
Administrative and social-psychological perspectives such as this 
tend to emphasize the key role of individuals as organizational leaders 
and innovators. There is a common tendency to assume that "organiza­
tions are people" and therefore the study of organizations is really the 
study of people (Aldrich, 1979:19). Although people do indeed reside 
in organizations and social relations do much to sustain organizations, 
such a view is incomplete. In the case of cooperatives, we will see 
that in many instances, control is out of the hands of members, managers 
and directors because of constraints in the extra-local environment. 
The Resource Dependence Perspective 
According to the resource dependence perspective, the number and 
distribution of interorganizational relationships in an environment is 
a function of organizational decisions and control over crucial resour­
ces. A key assumption of the model is that (Aldrich and Ffeffer. 197n: 
83):  
•  •  •  U  i - U  J - S - Z i i O  d i V  _ L C  U C . L  i J  C . _ L _ L  v  L l i C l .  
all the resources or functions required to maintain themselves, 
and therefore organizations must enter into transactions and 
relations with elements in the environment that can supply the 
Some interdependencies are based on differentiation and the interorgani­
zational division of labor. Others result from deliberate attempts to 
establish or avoid interdependencies. If the organizational environment 
is viewed as an interorganizational network, then uncertainty is reduced 
and resources are obtained through the control of crucial interdepen­
dencies . 
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To thrive, organizations must effectively manage the demands of 
groups upon whom they are dependent for resources. They may shape and 
manage environments through structures and planned activities. In some 
organizations, management of the environment may be an even more impor­
tant administrative activity than management of the organization 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1976). Support may be obtained through personal 
and organizational linkages. Boards of directors may provide linkages 
on the individual and the organizational level. 
The impact of external, environmental forces upon the organization 
is a key element of this perspective. The environment is defined in 
terms of resources (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976:92). Organizations may be 
active in shaping and controlling their future, but their dependence 
upon other organizations for resources is more crucial to their survival 
than the processes by which environmental information is perceived by 
decision makers. 
Putting the Pieces Together 
One must select those aspects of each perspective which are most 
applicable to the research problem. The three perspectives outlined 
above may be distinguished on the basis of units of analysis, what unit 
is selected by the environment, appropriate time frame and sources of 
VOj. JLOL-J-V/li » ViJLC w L. CU_ C O J- 6.CV1 .1.11 .L UL/ -LC:. , 
It is the responsibility of the research to specify the organization(s). 
units of analysis, relevant attributes of the environment (information, 
resources, other organizations, competition, etc.), organizational 
structure and characceriscics of decision makers. 
uii-L uo yji. mio-Ljy a 
The organizational analyst faces five levels of analysis (Hannon 
and Freeman- 1977:935): members, subunits^ individual organizations; 
populations of organizations and communities of populations of organi-
T CI ^   ^ T" r-* r~>  ^r~\ «1 I « c" * ^ i 1 ^   ^f-* r» 1  ^\=. .J-  ^• O N-AW  ^y Cfc  ^A. & uL. T w 
Ecological explanations vork better in some conditions than in others 
o- r\Ti f n *^ iZ0 '1 f t*Ko c 0 "h *^ iz^  n T e^'^ D^ rs cf 
Tab]G 1 u SuiiDiiary of key differences between three theoretical perspectives. 
UNITS OF WHAT IS SOURCES OF VARIATION, 
'ERSPECTIVE ANALYSIS SELECTED TIME FIIAME CHANGE, SELECTING AGENTS 
I'opulaCion Ecology Popiiliicion.;! of Organizational Evolutionary, Anything—luck, chance, 
(Pure natural organi::ations; forms; entire historical or planned or random variation, 
selection) single organize-- organizations. longitudinal. Source of change most often 
tion over time. environment, social or 
cultural forces. 
Resource Dependence Networlcs of All or part of Intermediate. Actions by resource control-
(Modified natural organizations. organization. lers; organizational actions 
soJection) Linkag(2s sets. Source of change- most often 
the environment J especially 
other organizations. 
Dacision Making Individual units, I.eadership Short-term. Decisions, planning, choices 
(Rational seloc- members, depart-- structure; Source of change most often 
tion) meats or other organizations individuals. 





the organizational set, and interorganizational characteristics such as 
amount and level of competition. Hannon and Freeman (1977) and Aldrich 
(1979) argue that this model may also be applied to the evolution of a 
single organization over time. 
The resource dependence perspective encompasses several levels of 
units of analysis—individuals, organizations and interorganizational 
relationships such as dyads. It is particularly well-suited to the study 
of interorganizational relationships because of its roots in exchange 
theory. The decision making perspective is suited to the study of indi­
vidual units ; typically organizational members. If the unit is the 
individual then, of course, personal and social characteristics, atti­
tudes and perceptions are important. 
a f- 1 c 
In pure natural selection, entire organizations are selected— 
either surviving or failing. In the most extreme case, entire popula­
tions might sucuumb. As pointed out by Campbell (1969), this perspective 
may also be applied to parts of organizations where the survival of one 
part (such as a department or division) is independent of another. 
According to Campbell (1969:74): 
But the general model does not require this limitation, and 
is a part of the disanalogy between organic and social evolu-
W A/-" 2 i -n f h ç» r>T*oc T i OT* 
system, and because of the greater variety of integrational 
organizations compatible with effective collection action. 
human social organizations, unlike the organizations of cells 
in the body and unlike the social organizations of insects, 
can be varied and eliminated and modified on a part-by-part 
Thus, the failure of one aspect of an organization does not spell failure 
i. i. LI!":: CLIL _L 1 C ill'c: ILCClJL 1. j.c v/J- ouL/mtu. 
as "nearly decomposable systems" allows organizations to survive while 
parts may fail (Simon, 1962). 
Modification of a pure natural selection view is consistent with 
an adaptation perspective toward organizations. Organizations may 
sur\Hve in a form, hardly recognizable from the original—as in the case 
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of merger or consolidation. This structural adaptation may be either 
planned or unplanned. 
Time Frame 
«.I  ^ n  ^"V \ /~s ry r\ *-» v» n T  ^ o O f ^ OTn 
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an evolutionary or historical perspective. The distribution of popula­
tions of organizations over time may be affected by events of which one 
is unaware or barely cognizant. To test the model, there must be present 
(Campbell, 1969:73) "consistent selection pressures operating over long 
enough periods and involving sufficiently large populations of social 
units to average out the purely fortuitous." The long time span of such 
models contributes to the explanation of organizational change, but also 
presents problems, especially the lack of longitudinal data and the 
danger of La'tology inherent in applying an evolutionary theory post hoc. 
In contrast, the decision making view is more short-term. Although 
Aldrich (19 79:108) suggests that in some cases there may be little dif­
ference between the time span of an explanation based on the rational as 
opposed to the environmental model, the life span of an organization 
frequently surpasses that of its members. 
Sources of Variation and Organizational Change 
The pure natural selection model is indifferent to the source of 
change. Planned events are no more likely to cause change than purely 
fortuitous events= In fset^ externa} environmental, social or cultural 
forces are most often the source of change. Nonetheless, the scheme is 
not haphazard (Campbell, 1559:74): 
It provides a plausible model for social systems that are 
'wiser' than the individuals who constitute the society, or 
t-p.PT-! rhp rati nra"! social science of the ruling elite. It 
provides an anticipation of powerful 'inadvertent' social 
change processes in our own day which may be adaptive in 
unforeseen and unwanted ways. 
"Rational" solutions may be provided without deliberate planning in the 
course of natural selection. The movement of organizations or other 
systems is toward increased adapcedness, complexity, size and systeiT; 
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integration of social units if such increases give selective advantage 
(Campbell, 1969:73). 
The rational selection model credits individuals, often leaders, 
with effecting organizational adaptation and survival. I«Ihile there are 
variations among schemes, the role of environment is generally minimal. 
The resource dependence perspective incorporates the environment as an 
integral component but the environment is defined more narrowly than in 
the population ecology model—usually in terms of external organizations 
upon whom the focal organization is dependent. Individual actions may 
also be salient. 
Synopsis 
The objective of this study is to apply appropriate aspects of each 
perspective to the research problem—cooperative autonomy and decision 
making in an uncertain environment dominated by extra-local forces. 
Most studies of boards of directors have taken a decision making or 
leadership approach; more recently, studies have taken the resource 
dependence perspective. Of course, none have taken the ecological 
approach because individual perceptions and actions are largely irrele­
vant to that perspective, although individual actions can be the source 
of variation. 
There is no monolithic model. Tne approach Ces) taken must be 
dictated by the data which are available and the socio-political context 
in which cooperatives exist. seen in Table i, the resource depen­
dence perspective occupies a mediating position between the population 
ecology and the decision making models. It will be the perspective 
relied on most heavily because, in the author's opinion, studies from, 
the resource dependence perspective in which the board of directors is 
the unit of analysis have been most illuminating. 
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to the survival of the cooperative than decisions made by boards or 
members or managers of the local cooperative. The ecological model 
would take this alternative view to its extreme with an assumption that 
in the longer view individual acts may be inconsequential. If the 
cooperative survives—through natural selection—this does not mean 
that it has the best decision making apparatus or personnel or even 
structure. Survival could mean simply that the cooperative was in the 
right geographical space at the right time and in the right socio­
political context. 
The resource dependence perspective seems to mediate these two 
extremes by allowing some effective actions by organizational partici­
pants. But because it emphasizes the vital importance of resources 
usually obtained externally—it tends to keep the efficacy of the indi­
vidual in proper perspective. The resource dependence perspective is 
not incompatible with the population ecology perspective, but it is 
more suitable for interpreting the individual and organizational data 
available. 
Data will be interpreted in the context of this study from the 
decision making and resource dependence perspectives. If longitudinal 
data were available for a more representative cross section of coopera­
tives, the population ecology perspective would also be applied. As 
it is, potential contributions of the ecological view will be confined 
to the final chapter. 
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Cooperatives in a Theoretical Setting 
Three assumptions will be developed using the three theoretical 
perspectives. The first two assumptions—that both cooperatives and 
their environmenrs are evolving—are drawn from ecological theory. The 
third assumption—that cooperatives are motivated as much by social and 
political as by economic concerns—is borrowed from the resource depen­
dence perspective. From these assumptions and the literature reviewed 
in this section, it is concluded that boards of directors will have an 
increasing role in cooperative survival. This conclusion is consistent 
with both decision making and resource dependence perspectives. 
Evolving Structures and Organizational Form 
The cooperative form may be viewed as an organizational adaptation 
to major shifts in the external environment. Cooperatives evolved as an 
organizational response by individual farm firms to external pressures. 
Cooperatives absorb for farm firms the uncertainty created by the natural 
environment, the economic or marketing structure of agriculture, techno­
logical change and interorganizational complexity. Of course, the 
salience of any particular external force will vary by individual cooper­
ative, kinds of cooperatives and by time frame. 
This report focuses on two forms of rural cooperatives: rural 
electrics and grain marketing cooperatives. Although other productive 
these two. They both hold unique positions in the history of the 
American cooperative movement. 
The development of U.S. cooperatives during the early part of this 
century was restricted largely to agriculture (Knapp, 1973:555). For 
some time, the word "cooperative" was nearly synonymous with agricul-
 ^ V O W O LV G. V.1 O W .1.  ^X 1  ^O k-/ -K O -J— W t L W ^  i. A.  ^ * 4, W W ^ A C* s** ^  Nh.. ^   ^
the natural and organizational environment. Relative to other systems 
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. . . agricultural commodity systems present complex coor­
dination problems—seasonal production but year round con­
sumption, production affected by uncontrollable events, rapid 
changes in technology, time lags between decisions and output 
realizations. 
The seasonability of production, perishability of output and uncontrol­
lable events such as droughts, flood, plant disease and pests are vaga­
ries of the natural environment. While cooperatives do not provide 
control over the natural environment, they may minimize the impact of 
natural forces- They provide commodity storage and marketing and pro­
vide information and service on plant disease and pest control. They 
provide some protection against fluctuations in the natural environment. 
Technological change also promoted the growth and development of 
cooperatives (especially the rural electric cooperative). The industrial 
revolution increased consumer demand for food and fiber. Farm mechani­
zation and communication and transportation innovations also impacted 
the primary producer and, in turn, cooperatives. 
Perhaps the strongest stimulant of cooperative development was the 
impact of the market structure of agriculture on many individual farm 
operations (Torgerson, 1977:92): 
The premise for cooperation lies primarily in the structural 
relationship of farm operators, characteristically atomistic 
pared to those with whom they buy and sell (few in number and 
yol jsr-i la-y-rro -i-r» T.T-î f-r, r»? i f- -î "i 4 f-i-" 
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diversification in product lines, and greater vertical inte-
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culture, a prime motivator in early organizing efforts associ-
operators. 
Cooperatives allow farmers to gain the benefits of large scale buying 
and selling, yet maintain the autonomy of individual firms. In sum, 
rural cooperatives enable farms to adaot to the organizational, natural 
19 
Rural electric cooperatives were formed to provide a service not 
available or available only at exhorbitant cost. Although they were not 
modeled after agricultural cooperatives (Knapp, 1973:364), they developed 
among a population acquainted with agricultural cooperatives. Grain 
marketing cooperatives did not realize the potential role of cooperatives 
in the supply of electricity because they had little concern with supply 
functions in general. 
Although it is debatable whether rural electric cooperatives repre­
sented a new form, we will viex. them as such. They filled an environ­
mental niche which did not exist before electrification (Knapp, 1973:348; 
Aldrich, 1979:171-181). Rural electric cooperatives were a product of 
many forces including (1) technological change; (2) government subsidy 
of public works during the Great Depression; and (3) the underestimation 
by private power companies of the demand for and profitability of elec­
tricity in rural America, The absence of competition by private power 
companies was essential to the success of rural electric cooperatives. 
Evolution of Organizational Environments 
Cooperatives today face external challenges of a different kind 
than in the past (French et al., 1980; Torgerson, 1977). The impact of 
technology, for example, has diminished relative to the impact of other 
organizations. In a review of the challenges facing cooperatives in 
-no-v^- n<o/-«o/-ioc T/->vryo>-'cr*r> /"iG7T; /n r\ a c: Ti f- -t-o r-* q " r\<y\r  ^ CP 
et al. (1980:4-9) stress the importance of continued technological 
development but it seems to this author that the impact of such advances 
will not compare with the magnitude of technological change experienced 
Torgerson (1977) place more emphasis on problems facing cooperatives 
that result from the rate of social change and the increasing complexity 
of the interorganizational environment—the evolution of cooperative 
environments. 
Emery and Tris: (1955) developed a typology of organizational-
environmental dependencies which reflects stases in the evolution of 
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organizational environments. Their framework includes intra-organiza-
tional relations, inter-organizational relations (input and output inter-
dependencies), and extra-organizational relations. Extra-organizational 
relations are remote, indirect and largely beyond the control of the 
organization. They constitute the "causal" texture of the field. In 
this framework, the inter-organizational relations are equivalent to 
what Osborn and Hunt (1974:231-233) call the task environment. Extra-
organizational relations are comparable to the combination of macro and 
aggregation environments. 
Organizations, such as cooperatives, are located in turbulent fields 
(Terreberry, 1968:80). In such fields, the accelerating rate and com­
plexity of extra-organizational relations may exceed a' cooperative's 
capacity for prediction and control. Thus, the evolution of organiza­
tional environments (the remote, causal texture) may exceed the rate of 
evolution of the organization itself. Rapid change in external connec­
tedness—extra-organizational relations—gives rise to increasingly 
unpredictable change in transactional interdependencies (the input and 
output interdependencies) (Terreberry, 1968:80). 
Uncertainty is a characteristic of turbulent fields. The uncer­
tainty produced by turbulent fields may be beyond the control of the 
O J. CCLU-LiUy CLiiVA L-Ui-Ui-lJ-CliV-C Ci-Li-Cv.,!- UliC KJ J. 
organizational environments such that the ratio of externally induced 
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and unpredictable change have implications for rational decision making 
and long range planning. 
Cooperatives are subject to external pressures which are often 
unpredictable and uncontrollable. Torgerson (1977:93) suggests chaz 
"the pace of structural change in the nonfarm sector is proceeding at 
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financial ability to organize in an effort to countervail it." Ke 
atLribuLes the changes lo the external environment of coopéra Lives 
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The external environment that establishes the climate for 
group action by farm operators has undergone an element of 
change in the mid-1970s. The basis for this change can be 
found in the basic supply and demand balance for food and 
fiber items, the rise of populism, and associated concern 
with size of institutions, financial constraints on younger 
farmers entering farming, and the prevailing enforcement of 
antitrust laws and other governmental regulations relating 
to group action by farmers. 
Additional external forces include the national and international econ­
omy , public opinion and resource shortages (fertilizer, water and 
petroleum). 
The External Control of Cooperatives 
According to Thompson (1967:66,67), the crucial problem for the 
boundary-spanning units of an organization is not coordination of 
variables under the control of the organization but adjustment to con­
straints and contingencies not controlled by the organization—what 
economists call exogenous variables. Cooperatives are increasingly 
controlled by external, often noneconomic, forces. Although primarily 
economic entities, cooperatives also have distinct social and political 
characteristics. They are economic systems with a social content 
(Casselmen, 1952:1). Cooperatives promote the ideal of mutual enter­
prise for mutual benefit. The cooperative movement was characterized 
by a broad social purpose (Torgerson, 1977:92): to improve one's self 
and community through democratic, self-help organizations. 
Cooperatives have historically subscribed to a normative ideology 
derived from, the "traditional principles of cooperation" formulated by 
the Rochdale weavers in England in 1844. The "Rochdale Principles" 
include (Kravitz, 1974:22): (1) open membership; (2) one man/one vote 
(3) cash trading; (4) membership education; (5) political and religious 
•—  ^^ "7 ^  1 -î m -T 4- A "î-r-s+'OT'OC'f" 
Stock; (S) goods sold at regular retail prices; (9) limitation on numbe 
of shares owned.; and (10) services at cost, with profits distributed 
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These ideas have evolved over time. Principles such as cash trad­
ing and no unusual risk are clearly outmoded whereas others continue to 
appeal to the loyalty and sentiments of many. Jerry Voorhis, former 
Executive Director of the Cooperative League, emphasizes the principles 
of open membership, limited interest, services at cost and one man/one 
vote (KravitZ; 1974:32). The U.S. Department of Agriculture emphasizes 
democratic member control, operations at cost and limited returns on 
investment (1974:33). The Agribusiness Accountability Project recom­
mends compliance with five principles (Kravitz, 1974:33): (1) open 
membership; (2) one man/one vote; (3) membership education; (4) limited 
interest on stock; and (5) limitation on number of shares owned. The 
Project suggests that adherence to these principles is not idealism, but 
a procedural key to assure farmer-member control of cooperatives—a 
practical consideration which legitimizes and maintains public support 
of cooperatives. 
The loss of public and legislative support may be the most serious 
challenge facing cooperatives because it threatens the existence of the 
organizational form and not just individual cooperatives. Political 
support for cooperatives has diminished with the shift of political con­
stituencies from rural to urban areas. As cooperatives exercise less 
political influence, they become more susceptible to political chal-
This is a relatively new phenomenon (Edick et al., 1980:5): 
Although cooperatives have had their critics over the years, 
to a large extent their activities did not artracc much public 
attention until the last decade. To be sure, the National Tax 
Equality League has campaigned long and hard for the repeal of 
what it perceived to be an unfair tax advantage granted to 
cooperatives. NTEL aside, cooperatives were generally regarded 
as relatively benign institutions. 
The economic viability of cooperatives results, in part, from the 
Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 which bestowed political legitimacy on 
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Democratic ideals of cooperatives distinguish them from other cor­
porations and engender public and legislative support. If legitimacy 
is socially as well as economically based, a single-minded pursuit of 
economic efficiency may not be the best political posture for coopera­
tives (Kravitz, 1974:36): 
If cooperative leadership intends to emulate corporate agri­
business . . . then they also must be prepared to give up 
their public supports. It is not merely a matter of keeping 
faith with the Rochdale Pioneers and other founders of the 
cooperative movement—it is a question whether the new-look, 
management-run, profit-motivated enterprises can continue to 
justify their special position under the law. or whether they 
ought to be treated like other agribusinesses. 
A committee reviewing and evaluating the Cooperatives' Unit of the 
Economics» Statistics and Cooperatives Ser^rice offers similar assess­
ment (Edick et al., 1980:5): 
Because some cooperatives have become successful, competitors 
and other detractors have severely attacked legislation basic 
to the formation and existence of cooperatives. These attacks 
are designed to convince the general public that cooperatives 
hold too much power because legislation gives then an unfair 
advantage in the market place. Such attacks are expected to 
intensify in the 1980s. 
Cooperatives can only maintain their social, political and economic 
Board Responsibilities 
The evolution of organizations and their environments and the 
increasing extra-local control of cooperatives implies new and more crit­
ical demands on boards of directors. Garoyan and Mohn (1976:vii; concur: 
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flicting values of stockholders or members, employees, 
management, and society, is at a turning point. We believe 
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vive, then the board itself must bring about changes in 
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In this section, we will examine some assessments of the importance of 
cooperative boards' decisions. This is done in the context of internal 
and external functions. This analysis supports the conclusion that 
boards -will play an increasing role in organizational survival. 
The role of boards of directors of rural cooperatives has reached 
2. critical point. This may be attribuLed, in part, to changes in 
the legal and political environments of corporations during the 1970s 
and the assignment of greater potential liability to directors for their 
actions and inactions (Aldrich, 1979:302). Experts believe that much 
responsibility for the future success or failure of cooperatives rests 
with the board of directors (Edick et al., 1980:5): 
In particular, boards of directors will need to be especially 
astute as they develop policy guidelines and performance stan­
dards for evaluating their organizations. . . . Directors are 
called upon to approve expenditures on exceedingly complex and 
risky capital projects. Operating budgets, ranging from hun­
dreds of thousands to billion? of dollars, require similar 
director approval. In this complex decision environment, 
directors are legally responsible for preservation of the 
cooperatives* assets. In an increasingly litigious society, 
this is a risk laden responsibility indeed. . . • Directors 
generally, proprietary as well as cooperative, are the objects 
of increasing scrutiny and criticism by stockholder and the 
general public. 
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of directors in relation to their environment or about how directors 
perceive their role (Edick et al., 1980:13): 
The director's job must be better understood in light of 
today's larger organizations and the more hostile environ­
ment in which cooperatives operate. First the director's 
job must be more carefully described and understood than 
It- -:s present r : = - The whole question of ~ho, indeed, 
controls the cooperative is bound directly to director per­
formance . 
The salience of internal to external considerations, for example, will 
probably vary across time, types of organizations, political conditions 
and hoard coTnnosi'tion. The fesearc" re^o^'ted -ill consider some of the 
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Boards of directors fulfill both administrative and representative 
functions (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Zald, 1969). These functions may 
be roughly dichotomized as internal (administrative) and external 
(representative) functions. Most studies of boards which take a deci­
sion making orientation tend to emphasize the function of the board in 
the internal (administrative) division of labor (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978:169). These traditional views also tend to underestimate the 
importance of the board for the organization. More recently, boards 
have been studied from the resource dependence perspective. A resource 
dependence interpretation supports the view that a largely external 
function—representation—is as or more important than the internal 
function—administration. The distinction between what is internal and 
what is external will be considered next. A major thesis will be that 
if the ratio of external to internally induced change increases as 
organizational environments evolve, and if boards are more concerned 
with external questions than mangement, then the role of boards in 
relation to management will increase. 
Administration—Internal Function 
In the ideal situation, boards snare five internal administrative 
tasks with management (Garoyan and Mohn, 1976:40-43): planning, orga­
nizing. directing, coordinating and controlling. Boards should he more 
active in planning and controlling, whereas organizing, directing and 
COOZ'GILnG.dLIl^ Z 2, J__L TliOTc TO . ZlOWcVcZ" ^ ZH.c. CILVXS^Gn or j.clDOir 
between board and management varies among organizations. In some orga­
nizations, boards may have no real role at all. 
Control is an internal administrative function which the board 
performs as the agent of the corporation at the request of the members 
(Zald, 1969:98). Members, employees and managers have some control 
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commitments of resources; and (4) selecting managers and determining 
managerial succession. In short, the board should oversee organiza­
tional operations to ensure that the interests of the owners are served. 
Planning is done by board and management to facilitate the adjust­
ment of the cooperative to the changing environment (Garoyan and Mohn, 
1976:80). In the ideal sense, boards, more than management, should make 
decisions on overall objectives, policies and goals of the organization 
and decisions involving long-range implications and consequential com­
mitment of resources, including facilities, finances and personnel 
(1976:73). A board considers the goals and policies of the cooperative, 
acceptable levels of risk and alternative ways of achieving objectives. 
The boards' role in planning is general, comprehensive and long-term 
in scope. 
Representation—^ External Function 
In a technical sense, directors serve as representatives for both 
internal and external audiences. Internally, directors advise execu­
tives and stockholders (or members) and act as trustees for stockholders 
(or members). In cooperatives, stockholders and members are the same 
and are viewed as internal constituents. we are more concerned here 
with external constituents. Externally, the board promotes and defends 
external audiences, including nonmember customers, creditors, suppliers, 
public agencies and the general public (Zald, 1969:98,99). 
oT t-11 AT-» +- c oo c»-r n -m aX a T-o r»r%m-n 3 T a n 1 C» f- n T.:'n a 
some researchers have called task environments. Dill (1958) defines 
the task environment as encompassing customers, competitors, suppliers 
AnH reg'-'l^tnTy jrniips. Oshnrn and rlur.t- (1976) define task environment 
as other organizations that are relevant to organizational goal setting 
and goal attainment. >lembers and technology are treated as internal to 
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that Osborn and Hunt (1974) use task environment, except that one less 
well defined group is included—the general public. Since rûany 
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representation only to nonmember customers. The role of the board in 
relation to members is considered as an internal, administrative respon­
sibility. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:11,34) apply the concepts of effective­
ness and efficiency, respectively, to internal and external functions. 
Effectiveness is one standard for measuring how well organizations meet 
the needs of external interest groups. External interest groups and 
organizations assess effectiveness on the basis on the legitimacy or 
usefulness of the organization. Legitimacy is externally derived and 
inseparable from values. Efficiency is an internal (often economic) 
measure of performance, based not on what is done but rather on how 
well it is done. 
In some instances, representation may be more important than admin­
istration (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:169). This is likely in the case 
of cooperatives in light of an assumption of this research that one of 
the administrative functions of the board of directors—control—is 
being usurped by increasing extra-local control of the cooperative. 
However, the relative importance of representation versus administration 
will vary with organizational context. A board which does not represent 
the political and social interests of the community may be less effec­
tive. However, in the case of local cooperatives, local representation 
may be less important for survival than extra-local representation. 
The implications of this conclusion for the community and the 
cooperative are complex. Torgerson (1977:91) suggests that the economic 
well-being of members and rural communities is the ultimate measure of 
cooperative success. while local control and autonomy may be desirable, 
it may not be feasible. Adherence to a rigid ideology of grass roots 
control will continue to result in cooperative mortality. Even if 
local autonomy could be maintained^ local government may not be the 
best form of government for the community or its organizations (Martin, 
is inversely related to its dependence on instinct, habit or traci-
tion. In such cases ^ the economic well-being of members and survival 
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of the cooperative and its members must take precedence over the well 
being of the community even if this means that the cooperative should 
cease to exist locally. 
The demands facing boards of directors of cooperatives are not 
simple. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) hypothesize that demands for 
effectiveness are increasing relative to demands for efficiency. Terre 
berry (1968) also forecast that the ratio of external demands would 
increase relative to internal demands as organizational environments 
evolve. In the organizational division of labor, management may pursue 
economic efficiency while the board pursues effectiveness. In these 
cases, the role of the board may increase relative to management and 
additional resources may be allocated to public relations in order to 
maintain organizational legitimacy. 
Theoretical Concepts 
Several theoretical concepts will be presented which are used in 
propositions about director's linkages with their environment and the 
role of linkages in reducing uncertainty. Linkages are viewed as both 
connections with the external environment and as sources of informa­
tion. In addition to these key concepts—uncertainty and linkages— 
several additional attitudinal and structural concepts will be pre­
sented. Uncertainty bears directly on board decision making and link-
of board decisions and, perhaps, promoting organizational autonomy. 
Environmental Uncertaintv 
iheorists from boch the resource dependence and the decision makir 
perspectives assume that complex, unstable and unpredictable environ-
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Although popular, the concept remains ambiguous. Uncertainty has many, 
sometimes opposite, meanings. In the following discussion, several 
cnmnone^tP of -i.i 11•;-ci1 onp 1 concent of environmental uncertain* 
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In the classical management sense, uncertainty is the inability to 
calculate probabilities for alternative choices. More recently, uncer­
tainty has been viewed as a lack of information or, more specifically, 
the lack of feedback on the outcomes of decisions. For example, 
MacCrimmon and Taylor (1975:1402) suggest that uncertainty "exists in 
decision situations involving only partial knowledge of relevant vari­
ables. . . ." According to Lev (1975:864), an uncertain environment 
"does not fully disclose the alternatives available or the consequences 
of these alternatives." Galbraith (1973:5) describes uncertainty as 
"the difference between the amount of information required to perform 
the task and the amount of information already possessed by the organi­
zation. " 
Uncertainty may also result from too much information or the inabil­
ity (of decision makers) to discriminate among large quantities of 
information. There is some evidence that information alone may not be 
sufficient to reduce uncertainty. More information may increase uncer­
tainty because an individual or an organization has limited capacity 
to absorb all potential information (Nystrom, 1974). Decision makers 
may reach a point of limited return on additional increments of informa­
tion and switch from maximizing to satisficing models of decision making 
(March and Simon, 1958). 
Organizational environments are often described in terms of their 
uncertainty. Pfeffer and Saiancik (1978:67^68) caution one not to con­
fuse uncertainty with change; 
Uncertainty refers to the degree to which future states of the 
world cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted. Uncer­
tainty, according to the prevailing literature, tends to be 
associated with decentralized, less formalized organizations. 
. . . Occasionally, uncertainty has been confused with change 
(e.g., Osborne and Hunt, 1972). It is of course, quite possi-
ole CO have rapid change which is predictable and, therefore, 
not uncertain. Uncertainty is determined by the level of fore­
casting capability of the organization at a given point in 
Uncertair.cy izself is noc problematic. It is a problem for 
O'V OI f C T-r-»pT- P"»~Û 
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important for the organization. Uncertainty is only problem­
atic when it involve? an element of critical organizational 
interdependence. 
In this research, uncertainty is defined as the inability to forecast 
the outcomes of alternative choices because of rapid and unpredictable 
changes in interorganizational and extraorganizational environments. 
Environment Definitions of environment range from a general, 
broad conception of environment as "everything out there" to more pre­
cise specifications (Starbuck, 1975). Environment may be described as 
all elements with which organizations have immediate, direct inter­
actions, including elements involved in or created by interorganizational 
relationships, and elements with which the organization has remote, 
indirect interactions. This definition encompasses most of the aspects 
delineated by Starbuck (1975:1082) and is consistent with the typology 
of organizational environmental interdependencies advanced by Emery and 
Trist (1965). 
It may be more useful to delimit the boundaries of the organization 
and its environment. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:12,13) adopt a more 
restricted view of the environment because an organization may be 
buffered from some elements in the environment while other elements are 
not important enough to require a response. As discussed earlier, 
environment is here dichotrorrized into the task environment and the aggre-
g d C C  G i i U .  iUG. U. .L V/ CiiSii wm-iC iA L. OO Vi C V- ^ C- w J" v_/ O i. i. ^ ^  / » 
The task environment is defined in terms of organizations with whom the 
focal organization has organizational or interpersonal connections. 
This view is similar to the concept of organization-set in which the 
relations between the focal organization and its organization-set are 
mediated by the role-sets of boundary personnel and the flow of infor-
task environment may be viewed as a more "local" environment because 
• i f  4  l  T  T c c  m r \ r - o  T . T T r n  r n < 2 i  
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environment is the general cultural context of a specified geographical 
area which may influence organizational characteristics and outputs. 
The aggregate environment includes associations, interest groups and 
constituencies operating within a given macro-environment. Together 
they constitute a larger, more general framework in which all organiza­
tions in a state, national or geographic area must operate. Personnel 
or members (and in the case of cooperatives, most customers) are 
treated as part of the organization, not the environment. 
In addition to some confusion over organizational/environmental 
boundaries, researchers also tend to disagree on the impact of an 
objective environment. For example, decision making research tends to 
understate the influence of an objective environment and may point to 
factors which limit the influence of the environment on the organization. 
Public funds, for example, may protect organizations from possible fail­
ure. Child (1972) suggests that the environment is not an overwhelming 
constraint on organizations because decision makers have more autonomy 
than credited with by environmental determinists and may in fact have 
the power to reshape their environment. Child also suggests that 
environmental determinism blurs the distinction between the characteris­
tics of the environment and the perception of those characteristics by 
persons within the organization. These three issues—the role of public 
runes, organizational power and auconomy, and Lue lixyuL caiicc ul uc;_ucy-
tions—will be discussed briefly. 
First, although the reliance of many organizations on public funds 
may protect them from the possibility of economic failure (Aldricn and 
Pfeffer, 1976:88), even among public organizations there can be intense 
competition for funds and occasionally these organizations ^  cease to 
exist. Public organizations are vulnerable to demands tor public 
accountability. They may fail due to the lack of public or legislative 
support. However, the argument that an environmental perspective is 
best applied in situations of relatively unrestricted competition among 
V 1 ^ r-î >—mc: p C c r*mo 0/4 l ^  l 1 4 
32 
Second, although some organizations may have the power to reshape 
their environments, the power to modify environments appears to be 
limited to the largest organizations or those that are politically well 
connected. The following statement by Perrow (19 70:99) is only par­
tially correct: 
Society is adaptive to organizations, to the large powerful 
organizations controlled by a few, often overlapping, leaders. 
To see these organizations as adaptive to a 'turbulent,' 
dynamic, ever-changing environment is to indulge in fantasy. 
The environment of most powerful organizations is well con­
trolled by them, quite stable, and made up of other organiza­
tions with similar interests, or ones they control. 
Although perhaps true for a few very powerful organizations, the situa­
tion is reversed for the majority of small and competitive organizations. 
The population of business organizations is bifurcated by size 
(Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976:88). One segment of very large organizations 
has a low mortality rate and the other segment of small organizations 
has a high rate of variation and turnover. The larger organizations 
are somewhat free from environmental restraints but many of the smaller 
organizations have much less freedom of choice and power as indicated 
by the very high mortality rate among new, small organizations. Among 
industrial firms, approximately half survive less than two years and 
four-fifths less than ten years (St^rbuck; 1975 : j 106.) . Small and less 
powerful organizations are more vulnerable to environmental fluctuations 
than large and more powerful organizations. 
Third; although the environment may be perceived differently by 
decision makers in organizations with varying structures and information 
systems, certain conditions may also minimize the influence of percep­
tions. The issue of real versus perceived environment is complex and 
may ultimately depend on the type of organization and the social, polit­
ical and cultural context. Next, some facets of the debate over per­
ceptions will be considered. 
Perceptions The concept of environmental uncertainty is often 
predicated with the modifier perceived which elicits a debate on the 
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relative importance of organization or individual cognizance of uncer­
tainty. Some theorists claim that the effects of uncertainty are never 
independent of perceptions, whereas others point to factors which mini­
mize the importance of perceptions. It is essentially a debate over 
the subjective versus the objective nature of the environment. 
Most decision making research emphasizes the perceptual nature of 
uncertainty. If environments are enacted or created through the infor­
mation gathering systems of organizations (Weick, 1969; Child; 1972, 
Galbraith, 1973), then uncertainty is a consequence of the way in which 
organizations and individuals structure information about the environ­
ment. Both organizational structure and individual perceptions may 
filter, distort or sharpen the perception of environmental-organiza­
tional interactions. 
Those emphasizing the inseparable relation between environmental 
uncertainty and its perception acknowledge only the symbolic or cogni­
tive level of interaction whereby individuals and organizations respond 
to meanings they attribute to various environmental conditions according 
to their perceptions of their surroundings (Dunlap and Catton, 1979:253) 
This is the view of symbolic interactionists. 
However, individuals and organizations may interact with the 
environment on at least three different levels—the cognitive, the 
behavioral, and the physiological—and these levels may interact in yet 
tions may be affected by environmental conditions which they do not 
perceive and have thus not assigned a symbolic label or attributed any 
cultural meanings. Some aspects of the natural environment (drought, 
flood, soil erosion, resource depletion) may have direct, nonsymbolic 
effects on individuals and organizations in addition to perceived 
have received the greatest attention, the behavioral and the physiolog-
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The extent to which subjective perceptions deviate from objective 
conditions and the manner in which perceptions vary within, across and 
between organizations awaits further research (Starbuck, 1975:1098). 
However, uncertainty conceptualizations tend (perhaps necessarily) to 
be organization-specific. Therefore, the researcher must "be sure the 
uncertainty concepts implicit in the selected instrument are consistent 
with the uncertainty conceptualization, either implicit or explicit, 
which is guiding the research (Downey, Hellriegel and Slocum, 1975:627). 
It was suggested earlier that certain conditions may minimize the 
influence of perceptions. For example, hiring personnel from the same 
industry or subpopulation may create common perceptions of the environ­
ment in a subpopulation of organizations. Each organization is less 
sensitive to idiosyncracies of the local environment when perceptions 
are universally shared because no single organization is at a relative 
advantage or disadvantage in the competition for resources (Aldrich and 
Pfeffer, 1976:95). 
In a highly competitive market, the salience of the objective envi­
ronment appears to increase while that of the perceptions of that envi-
ronm.ent decreases. For example (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976:92), 
. . . if the organization is severely constrained by the 
environment, as in a very competitive market, then perception 
operate and perceive effectively or else it will soon go out 
of existence. Perceptions become important to the extent 
ry-nf-t 4 c f f r\m o "t ttimi 1t10 f- 0tt\71 t"p1tï — 
effects. To the extent that the organization is not 
tightly constrained, variations in perceptions of organiza-
zational structures and processes. 
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clonal density (Starbuck, 1975:1077). %cn the number of interdependent 
organizations is very large, interorganizational perceptions are diffuse 
and general. The impact of any one organization upon another are 
diminished. Perceptions affect organizational behavior only when the 
nooulation of organizations is small and stable enough for one 
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organization to perceive others as unique. When the population is very 
small, the impact of any one organization on another increases because 
one is able to forecast the actions of others. But such forecasts are 
unnecessary because the small number makes direct negotiation feasible. 
Sparsely populated sectors are thus inclined to form coalitions. 
Uncertainty in the Context of Cooperatives This study will take 
two approaches to uncertainty, each of which assumes that, as a popula­
tion of organizations, cooperatives exist in a highly uncertain environ­
ment. Cooperatives originated to absorb the economic uncertainty of 
individual farm firms (Knapp, 1973). Twenty-five years ago, coopera­
tives still existed in a very uncertain environment (Casselman, 1952: 
124,125): 
Of all industries, agriculture has the most factors of uncer­
tainty. In addition to an erratic demand for its products . , . 
the supply is most difficult to forecast and to control owing 
to climatic conditions, plant disease and insect pests . . . 
[and] . . . seasonability and perishability of agricultural 
produce. . . . The chief crops are produced once annually, yet 
they are in demand every day of the year. Difficulties of 
transportation, of fixed storage, and of refrigeration in tran­
sit, are thereby introduced. Furthermore, of all commodities, 
those produced on the farm are the most dissimilar in size, 
appearance and quality; hence their marketing requires a very 
complicated set of standards and rather strict supervision. 
riT.T -i r T.TO ri t-o •t-Vio 3 A ol f-c fHo 
of disunity and of absolute competition among thousands of 
farmers on the one hand, and that of well organized or monopo­
lizing middlemen on the other^ we have a state of anarchy in 
our agricultural economy. 
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because of the evolution of its organizational environments. Torgerscn 
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past. Although challenges of a new sort may face cooperatives, produc­
tion decisions continue to be made individually by farm operators in 
response to market signals. 
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Types of organizations may be arrayed along a continuum from high 
to low uncertainty. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:155) postulate a curvi­
linear relationship between uncertainty and industrial concentration, 
with uncertainty greatest in firms of intermediate concentration. Coop­
eratives fit into this intermediate, highly uncertain category because 
they are more concentrated than individual farm firms, for example, but 
much less so than many industrial corporations and larger agribusinesses 
The complex coordination problems of agriculture, the dispersion of 
farm operations, and the historically high mortality rate of farms and 
cooperatives suggest that cooperatives are not effectively insulated 
from environmental effects but are, instead, quite vulnerable. Thus, 
competition and environmental restraints may render perceptions less 
important than in some other industries (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976:92). 
Data which document high mortality rates further support the assumption 
that cooperatives exist in an uncertain environment relative to many 
other populations of organizations (Starbuck, 1975:1104). 
Boundary Spanning Activities and Linkages 
Boundary spanning activity is a multi-dimensional concept which 
refers to activities that are performed and connections established 
through interorganizational or interpersonal relationships with organi­
zations comprising the task environment. Some theorists, such as 
Thompson (1967), suggest thst uncertainty results in the Gstablisr~:ent 
of a boundary spanning structure. Others, such as Leifer and Ruber 
(1977), suggest that the structure may account for perceived uncer­
tainty. Ivhatever the direction of the relationship, it is generally 
agreed that there is some association between uncertainty and boundary 
spanning activities. 
Resource dependence theorists (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) maintair 
that boundary spanning activities are undertaken in order to obtain 
tainty. Boundary spanning functions may be ful fil Ted ny perso-^s "'n 
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relative to significant external audiences. The focus here is upon the 
boards of directors of cooperatives as an informal boundary spanning 
unit. It is assumed that the boundary spanning activities of the boards 
vival under conditions of uncertainty. 
Coping with organizational environments requires stabilizing them 
or somehow reducing the uncertainty they impose upon the organization. 
Thompson (1967:67) suggests that organizations subject to rationality 
norms seek to isolate their technical cores from environmental influ­
ences by establishing boundary spanning units to buffer or level envi­
ronmental fluctuations. The responsibility of the boundary spanning 
unit is to adjust to exogenous variables—constraints and contingencies 
The extent to which organizations establish boundary spanning roles 
depends upon (1) the size and formality of the organization and (2) the 
degree of stability and homogeneity of the task environment. Small 
organizations are able to survive with fairly simple structures, using 
few differentiated roles and functions (Aldrich, 1979:255). Because 
they are less formalized, small organizations are more adaptable; that 
is, they may more easily restructure for changing environmental condi-
•* -'* "1 v/% t.tn1lt-»-»rr n "k1 d f- r\ -ya 1 tr> r mftna i mn "Ît> f dt— 
mally, such as through members, personnel or boards of directors. 
Organizations facing stable and homogeneous task environments are 
less likely to establish elaborate boundary spanning structures. As 
explained by Thompson (1967:73): 
The more heterogeneous the task environment, the greater the 
constraints presented to the organization. The more dynamic 
the task environment, the greater the contingencies presented 
to the organization. Under either condition, the organizacion 
seeking to be rational must put boundaries around the amount 
and scope of adaptation necessary, and it does this by estab­
lishing structural units specialized to face a limited range 
of contingencies within a limited set of constraints. The 
more constraints and contingencies the organization faces, 
the mere its boundary-spanning component will be segmented. 
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Of course, organizations may face environments that are homogeneous and 
unstable or heterogeneous and stable. 
A Resource Dependence Interpretation According to a resource 
dependence inuerprecacion (Aldrich, 1979:293), decision makers possess 
an implicit hierarchy of preferred interorganization strategies. The 
first is a proprietary strategy where organizations maintain possession 
and control over resources and protect organizational boundaries. Their 
second preference is to cooperate or negotiate with another organization 
on a dyadic basis—entering into interorganizational relations, placing 
members on boards of directors, engaging in joint ventures, or merging 
with or acquiring another organization. The third strategy involves 
the cooperative interaction of many organizations and tends to occur 
when uncertainty and interorganizational dependence cannot be coped with 
by using either proprietary or dyadic strategies. Boards of directors 
implement a dyadic strategy whereby organizations give up some autonomy 
in order to win a greater measure of control over essential resources. 
According to the resource dependence perspective, boards provide 
living linkages with the environment. They fulfill two boundary span­
ning roles (Aldrich, 1979:249,251); (1) an information processing role 
and (2) an external representation role concerned with resource acquisi­
tion «nd disnnsal. ""nev in^y p.cconiulisn triese rules Lriiuu^n uLuei orga­
nizational memberships or through other directorships. 
The resource dependence perspective may be applied to interlocking 
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representation function of boards and point out two advantages of using 
board appointments to obtain continuing support from significant seg-
TV» /-». -t- V» f- • 
with the organization, which provides opportunities for infor­
mation sharing. The organization is in a position to obtain 
information from important interest groups and at the same time 
present information and persuade representatives to its own 
T-xz-xcn TO +- n o f" ol : ir r* r» c f" i to 
elements can be neutralized by the fact that any one board 
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member represents only a small proportion of the entire board 
in most cases. The forced need to make decisions may create 
pressures for uniformity. . . . 
However, the advantages of outside representation are tempered by the 
danger of overrepresentation of oucside forces and the subsequent loss 
of organizational autonomy. Perhaps this is why is is not the preferred 
strategy for managing organizational interdependence and uncertainty. 
Aldrich (1979:297) provides a comparable, although not strictly 
parallel, list of the external representative functions fulfilled by 
interlocking board appointments: (1) to obtain financial, legal or 
other strategic information or expertise; (2) to aid the organization in 
the search for capital or other resources; (3) to enhance the political 
power of the organization; and (4) to serve the interests of powerful 
external organizations. 
Linkages may be provided by both internal and external board mem­
bers. Internal directors (members or stockholders) provide linkages 
through their other organizational memberships or affiliations. Exter­
nal directors (nonmembers or stockholders) provide more direct linkages. 
"Outside" directors may be appointed to provide the board with special 
expertise (managerial or legal) or to co-opt and gain the support of 
important organizations in the task environment with which the organiza-
Cooperative Boards as Boundary Spanning Units Cooperatives 
exist in a network of interdependent organizations. They depend on some 
organizations for the resources required for survival and other organi­
zations may depend on them. Since organizational sur\-ival requires 
obtaining scarce resources, cooperatives must adapt to, cope with and 
attem^pt to manage and control crucial interdependencies. Dependence 
upon external agents for resources may lead to interorganizational 
actions such as mergers, joint ventures and cooptation (Aldrich and 
Pfeffer. 1976:92). Cooperatives may also manage the demands of orga-
through interorganizational boundary spanning activities such as 
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memberships and affiliations with other organizations in the task envi­
ronment. Boundary spanning activity is a means of obtaining resources, 
including information, and reducing uncertainty. 
Boundary spanning activity has costs for the organizations, includ­
ing loss of organizational autonomy, but may be necessary for organiza­
tional survival. It is also expensive to establish specialized boundary 
spanning units. Thus, many small, less formalized organizations must 
rely on information gained informally through members, directors or 
other personnel (Aldrich, 1979:255). This strategy is less expensive 
and suits small organizations because, since they are less formalized, 
they may more easily restructure for changing environmental conditions. 
Thus, it is assumed that in small, local cooperatives, directors often 
fulfill a boundary spanning function. 
It was also seen earlier than boundary spanning units tend to be 
most differentiated in unstable and heterogeneous conditions (Thompson, 
1967:73). The task environment of small, local cooperatives appears 
to be dynamic (rapidly changing), but relatively homogeneous. That is, 
members of the task environment serve similar societal needs, are con­
trolled by similar societal groups, with similar goals, structures, 
methods of operation and constituencies (Osborn and Hunt, 1974:234). 
Therefore, 
If the task environment is dynamic but relatively homogeneous, 
the boundary spanning co-ponont need be differentiated or sub­
divided only CO the extent that its capacity to monitor the 
Thus., one would expect boards of direccors of small cooperatives to fill 
informal boundary spanning functions. As cooperatives increase in size 
and task environments become more neterogenaous, cooperatives will seek 
to identify homogeneous segments and establish structural units to deal 
with each (Thompson, 1967:70). 
Resource dependence ideas must be modified to apply to coopera­
tives. The use of outside (nonmember) directors by rural cooperatives 
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differ from ordinary corporations is that only patron members may be 
elected to direct Iowa cooperatives. Despite limitations on the use of 
"outside" or professional directors, directors may still function as 
representatives as a consequence of their membership in cooperative as 
well as noncooperative organizations, through participation in profes­
sional meetings and by affiliation with regional associations. Coopera­
tives gain the benefits of "outside" directors through the use of busi­
ness professionals, including auditors, attorneys, investment consul­
tants, collection specialists, and business management consultants 
(Dewey, 1975:27). Advisory committees may be established with repre­
sentatives from outside the cooperative. Although cooperative boards 
have no "outside" members, they are still able to fulfill representative 
functions. 
Each of the three perspectives toward organizations differ in 
their approach to the concepts of environment, uncertainty (and the 
importance of perception), and linkages. This review has not dealt 
exhaustively with the concepts from all three vantages. Some key 
ideas from this discussion, as well as some missing linkages, are pro­
vided in Table 2. 
Organizational Form (or Type) 
Cirsanizational foïTû is a couceût oi concei-'u uéïc Lecause the sLuuv 
includes two different types of cooperatives: rural electrics and 
grain cooperatives. A major concern is whether type will have different 
utiO X vi;oocii. ^ .L u .LCi:: . lao. u.ii u G. v./j-^<=.11 j. u J-w i-iG. J. 
autonomy and making quality decisions in an environment dominated by 
extra-local forces. Whether the t'.-jo types of organizations are in fact 
ci-ffifoTTDs is c stion wriicn inusti 02 11]_3d tinrou^b, Tss63.rc*". 
The concept of organizational form has validity only with units of 
analysis larger than the single organization. The following discussion 
a i tr>^-o f-T, —l-io iTra 
organizational form is a consequence of environmental, social and 
Tabic 2, Ovcrvicv/ of key concepts f:-om three theoretical perspectives. 
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cultural forces. Form is defined broadly and refers not to the shape 
of a particular organization but to the shape(s) of a class of organiza­
tions. Forces affecting the nature and distribution of resources in a 
specific environment account for differing organization forms. These 
forces include the role of the state, urbanization, technological inno­
vation, characteristics of the labor market, and access or lack of 
access to power and wealth (Aldrich, 1979:164-133). These forces not 
only account for the origin of new forms but are also impediments or 
facilitators of the continued existence of new forms. 
Organizational forms are specific configurations of goals, bound­
aries and activities. As organized activity systems, organizational 
forms are oriented toward exploiting the resources within a niche 
(Aldrich, 1979:28). Organizational niches are distinct combinations of 
resources and other constraints that are sufficient to support an orga­
nizational form (1979:28). All organizational forms fill an environ­
mental niche, but not all niches have been exploited by an organiza­
tional form. However, the trend is toward niche saturation. 
Cooperative Form(s) In response to economic pressures among 
cooperatives, some organizations have grown and some have disappeared, 
frequently after bitter inter-cooperative rivalry (Edick et al., 1980: 
10). Thp roncp.nr.rp.tion of resources among some cooperatives is such 
that they may enter and control lateral niches. However, the extent 
to which organizational growth and activities such as mergers, consoli­
dations, and vertical and horizontal integration result in new organiza­
tional forms is subject to some dispute given the current state of 
organizational theory. 
To determine whether rural electric cooperatives and grain elevator 
cooperatives are two different forms, it is necessary to examine their 
goals, boundaries and activities. Their origins suggest that they are 
different forms since they emerged at separate times and independently 
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vary. When structure varies to such an extent as to significantly 
alter goals, boundaries and activities, a new form of organization may 
have emerged. 
Theoretical Hypotheses 
In this section, the relationships between two measures of environ­
mental uncertainty and structural, organizational and individual corre­
lates are posited. An understanding of these relationships should help 
determine the extent to which boards are limited by uncertainty and to 
which uncertainty is associated with individual, organization, or inter-
organizational coping strategies. In the next chapter, data will be 
used to test these relationships at both the individual (director) and 
organizational (board or cooperative) level. 
Drawing upon resource dependence theory, it was seen that directors 
may serve in a strategic boundary spanning capacity. Directors of local 
cooperatives fill a less formal role than in larger organizations and 
in noncooperative organizations where directors may be recruited solely 
to fill representative functions. Although it is generally agreed that 
there is some relation between uncertainty and boundary spanning activ­
ity, there is disagreement as to which is cause and which is consequence. 
ovpinplp. Tnoinuso!! (]Su7) and Other structural contingency theorists 
suggest that uncertainty results in the establishment of a boundary 
spanning structure. Others, such as Leifer and Ruber (1977), suggest 
that siiructure and/or boundary spanning activities may account for per-
/-»o-î"*rqri t tti r^ or-f-n t* v , 
Even if stated noncausally, the direction of the association is 
On one hand, linkages nay he said to be associated 
with lower levels of uncertainty to the extent that linkages serve an 
uncertainty reducing (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:145) or uncerraincy 
Aidrich, 1979:250). On the other hand; linkages 
may be said to be associated with higher levels of uncertainty. Tlie 
reasoning here is tnat if organization members accenipc co reduce per-
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levels of uncertainty would engage in more boundary spanning activity 
in order to bring that uncertainty down to some manageable level (Leifer 
and Ruber, 1977:238-239). Thus, we might expect the frequency of 
"U. ^ . •—« J - V-T <,7 *- r3CC'^/-»n*3^Cn4 T.T-Î 
environmental uncertainty. 
While both theoretical arguments have merit, it is here hypothe­
sized that boundary spanning activities (in this case, linkages) will 
be associated with lower levels of uncertainty. It is assumed that 
by obtaining additional resources and information through increased 
external involvement, boards will become more certain about the environ­
ment. Furthermore, it is hypothesized that this relationship will held 
for both directors and boards and for both individual and cooperative 
iiritcs-gcs • 
Some theorists (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976:92; Starbuck, 1975) 
suggest that uncertainty is greater in situations of relatively unre­
stricted competition and for organizations of a smaller size that have 
fewer resources with which to acquire information and control inter-
organizational dependencies. Thus, the second theoretical hypothesis 
is that competition (both cooperative and noncooperative) will be 
associated with higher levels of board uncertainty. In this case, an 
"io ooci ima /-Ï -t" r\ p*o •yolat'o/^ ja r^OT'r^.'OT»—» 
tual variable (uncertainty) which will be aggregated by boards. 
The third hypothesis is that larger size will be associated with 
lower levels of uncertainty. Size is viewed as both number of members 
and volume of business. The rationale for this hypothesis is that 
organizations with more members and with a larger volume of business 
hsvR more resources with which to acquire needed resources and informa­
tion (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976:92). In this case, size is interpreted 
as a proxy measure for structure. 
The fourth hypothesis is that traditionalism—a normative ideology 
coward cooperatives—will be associated with lower levels of uncer-
caincy. This hypothesis assuiucs thai. LradiLloaaliSu; is a Aor^ativc 
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prevent the adaptation necessary for survival (Terreberry, 1968), it 
may also provide a form of ideological security which may prevent neces­
sary change and reduce the perception of uncertainty. 
In sum. the following relationships are hypothesized: 
1. an inverse relation between uncertainty and boundary spanning 
activities (linkages) for both directors and boards and for 
both individual and cooperative linkages 
2. a direct relation between level of competition (cooperative 
and noncooperative) and uncertainty 
3. an inverse relation between size and level of uncertainty 
4. an inverse relation between traditionalism and level of uncer­
tainty 
These relationships are complicated by potential differences between the 
two types of cooperatives : rural electric and grain elevators. Grain 
elevators and rural electric cooperatives may differ in several ways, 
including level of uncertainty, as a consequence of type. Because of 
possible confounding effects of type on measures of size, competition 
and boundary spanning activities, type of cooperative is theoretically 
justified as a control variable. 
After determining whether these relationships exist, the analysis 
will shift from the individual to the organizational level and examine 
^ T nk-aoA c PC rh(= p h pn nrnpn on ro be exolained. Tiié COrrêlatêS 3û£Clfl£d 
will be organizational attributes. It is assumed that cooperatives 
exist in an uncertain environment and that resource dependence ideas 
about linkages are valid. The following relationships arc cxpcctcd: 
I. a direct relation between annual dollar volume of business 
and linkages 
linkages 
c t-t-^ 7 0 r-vo t-c: n 
3. a direcc relation between age of cooperative (years since 
incorporation) and linkages 
a direct relation between tenure of manager (years with the 
same cooperative) and linkages 
5- a direct relation between amount of compecicion (cooperative 
dUU. I uc J-d u-I-V y civivu 
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It is also expected that linkages will vary between the two types of 
cooperatives. Type of cooperative will again be treated as a control 
variable in partial correlations. 
The next chapter will focus on research procedures. The discussion 
will include a review of the background of the study, methodological pro­
cedures employed—including questionnaire construction, sample selection 
and data collection—and operationalization of the concepts presented 




This chapter contains an overview of the methods employed in the 
study. The study background and objectives are discussed first. Next, 
procedures such as questionnaire construction, sampling and data collec­
tion are presented. Finally, the key concepts are operationalized. In 
the next chapter, the empirical hypotheses are tested. 
A questionnaire was constructed and data were collected as a part 
of a research project designed to provide descriptive information to 
the Iowa Institute of Cooperation and to fulfill the requirements of a 
graduate internship in applied sociology. All stages of the research 
project from problem identification to the analysis of the data were 
guided by an applied methodology which was to provide information to 
this coordinating council. Although the compilation of data for 
descriptive purposes and for theoretical rigor are not mutually exclusive 
ends, the pragmatic purposes of the former do place limits on the latter. 
Since the data were not gathered for the purpose of hypothesis testing, 
their scientific utility and value is limited largely to hypothesis 
generation. Limitations imposed by the applied nature of the research, 
design are noted, such as the tentative nature of the hypotheses drawn 
from the board member survey. 
The data were collected during the summer of 1979 for the Executive 
Director of the Iowa Institute of Cooperation. The goal of the research 
was tc provide the director with a descriptive profile of the members 
of boards of directors of Iowa cooperatives. A profile of members of 
the boards of local Iowa rural electric cooperatives and grain coopera­
tives was to encompass but not necessarily be limited to the following: 
Study Background 
J. C ill p tc: i. G U J Cl m v v. 
of service; training experience; under 
functions, how they make decisions and 
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(1) cooperative philosophy 
(2) director responsibility to board, members and management 
(3) working relationships to manager and other employees 
(4) regional cooperatives 
(5) the Iowa Institute of Cooperation 
(6) member and public relations 
(7) cooperative commitment 
(8) ability of director to influence board with own ideas 
The Executive Director perceived a rapidly changing environment in both 
the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors and sensed that directors 
were insecure and confused about the real environment. The problem, in 
his words, was "to determine what groups can do procedurally to cope 
with constant change and to provide some tranquility for directors." 
The problem was defined in sociological terms as: "How can organizations 
such as cooperatives have autonomy and make quality decisions in a world 
made uncertain for them by extra-local forces?" 
Procedures 
Next, the methodological procedures employed will be discussed. 
These include questionnaire construction, sample selection and data 
collection. In the final section, the theoretical concepts will be 
operationalized. 
xucs.-ilcnnairc c^nctruc^ icn 
Two questionnaires were constructed: one for the cooperative 
directors and another for the managers of each cooperative. The second 
questionnaire was essentially a factual inform.ation sheet which helped 
to minimize the length and unnecessary duplication in the questionnaire 
that was developed for the directors. It also provided complementary 
data on the organizational level. Copies of both questionnaires are 
reproduced in Appendices A and B. 
The director questionnaire was a composite of original questions, 
questions submitted by the Executive Director of the Iowa Institute of 
Cooperarion, and questions derived from other organizational studies 
(BiggS; 1978; Warren et al.. 1973: Leifer and Ruber. 1977: and Dewey, 
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1975). The questionnaire was reviewed by the Executive Director of the 
Iowa Institute of Cooperation, members of the author's Program of Study 
Committee and other researchers with experience in the area of coopera­
tives^ The TPS^H^er questionnaire ^information sheet^ consisted entirel 
of factual questions regarding the cooperative. 
Prior to distributing the questionnaire, it was submitted to the 
University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects in Research. The 
research was approved by this committee on May 17, 1979. 
Sample Selection 
The organizational population consisted of rural electric coopera­
tives and grain elevator cooperatives belonging to a state cooperative 
coordinating council. Pragmatic reasons dictated the highly selective 
nature of this population. The first was limited research funds; the 
second, the internship sponsor. The research was undertaken as part of 
an applied internship in applied sociology which was designed to pro­
vide information to the sponsoring organization. The sponsor suggested 
including the two types of cooperatives. 
A random sample (n=90) was drawn from 169 grain elevators with 
membership in the Iowa Institute of Cooperation. All of the rural 
electric cooperatives (n=27) were included. The size of these samples 
University Statistical Laboratory. Consultation determined that all 
the rural electrics should be included because of the small number and 
that at least half of the grain elevators would insure adequate repre-
elevator cooperatives would be appropriate if financially possible, bu" 
\ V C M _ L L  L L O  L  L ' C  L .  D  U - L  T ? - L < _  D J - J .  V  C T C I L  ^  ;  - L  /  V  /  .  J - I L  L U D I L V  
applied research endeavors, practical considerations dictated the 
upper limit of the sample size. The consultants agreed that 90 grain 
elevators should adequately represent the to cal population (169). The 
90 cooperatives were selected through the use of a computer program to 
generate random numbers which was written by the author. 
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All of the directors of the sampled cooperatives were included in 
the study. The number of directors per cooperative ranged from five to 
fourteen. Managers of the same 117 cooperatives were also included. 
The study iiuus corisists of samples on tTfc levels: ? sample of coopera­
tives (n=117) and all the directors of the sampled cooperatives (n=960). 
Since samples were drawn on two levels, the study has two levels of 
units of analysis. In some instances, the unit of analysis may be the 
individual director; in other instances, the unit of analysis may be 
the board (aggregated individual responses) or the organization (based 
on the factual information provided by the managers). 
Data Collection 
Board member data were gathered during the summer of 1979 through 
the use of a questionnaire which was mailed to all board members of the 
117 Iowa cooperatives selected in the sample. The procedure for data 
collection was the "Total Design Method" (Dillman, 1978). The question­
naire, a cover letter, and a postage-paid return envelope were sent to 
all directors in June and were sent again in July to those directors 
who failed to respond to the first request for information. Copies of 
the cover letters included with the questionnaires are provided in 
Appendix C. 
A manager luIumiaLlca sheat vac mailed in July of 
the 117 cooperatives. A duplicate information sheet was sent in August 
to the managers who did not respond to the initial request. The 
managers were the source of the organizational level data. They pro­
vided information which would have been mere difficult to obtain from 
the directors. 
The final response rate was 50 psrcenL uf Che directors and 92 
percent of the managers. Response rates by cooperatives ranged from 
zero to IOC percent. The return rates, by first and second wave 
responses, for both directors and cooperative managers are summarized 
in Table 3. l-Jhereas a higher response rate for directors would have 
been preferred, a third wave was not done for economic and practical 
reasons (the farmers would have been in the midst of harvest). 
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Tabic 3. Summary of return rates. 
DIRECTORS MANAGERS 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
First Wave Return 270 28% 100 85% 
Second Wave Return^ 211 22% 8 7% 
Total Return Rate 481 30% 108 92% 
Total Mailed 960 117 
Number Excluded 58 0 
Late Receipt 4 
Incomplete Information 7 
No Longer Director 27 
Number in Data Analysis 443 108 
^Some overlap inevitable between first and second mailings 
In this section, two measures of uncertainty are operationalized. 
Xext, three measures of linkages (and some components) are set forth, 
followed by a single item indicator of traditionalism. Finally, several 
structural and organizational measures are operationalized: competition, 
size, tenure of manager, cooperative age, and type of cooperative. 
Uncertainty is approached from two dimensions. The first uses 
seven sinsle item indicators which reflect an information view of the 
53 
environment. These items are based on the common assumption that com­
plex, unstable and unpredictable environments generate uncertainty. 
According to Aldrich (1979:110), a special concern with investigators 
adopting sn infn-TTnafinn perspective is the impact of uncertainty on the 
ability of organizational participants. The items included are 
intended to measure the impact of various sources of uncertainty on the 
ability of directors to make decisions. 
The seven items are listed below. The first three are adapted from 
items used by Leifer and Huber (1977:240); the last four are of a simi­
lar, but more general, form: 
1. How often are there changes in the social, economic and 
political conditions outside your cooperative which 
directly affect board decisions? 
2. How often do you need to gather information from some 
person or organization outside your cooperative in order 
to m.ake a decision? 
3. How often do you feel uncertain about the results of 
board decisions? 
4. How often are the plans made by the board affected by 
changes in government policies and regulations? 
5. How often are the plans made by the board affected by 
lack of knowledge of competitors' actions? 
n. rin-u' n f r p n  are hoard plans affected by rapid and unpre-
/ - « Î — - î » - >  f  N-É. a. S_ L. CI C -1_ J-ti i iv— a.Ci.i.4n v_ . 
7. How often are board plans affected by rapid and unpre-
r«'r-i -n o-o i n f ^  o ryoTi 1 d mn mnAT 
The first three items appear to relate more to situations under which 
uncertainty might develop. The last four items relate to sources of 
perceived uncertainty which, based on the review of literature, seem 
particularly cogent. 
Responses are distributed on a five point scale ranging from one 
(never) to five (often). The responses are scaled for individual 
directors by summing individual uncertainty scores. Next, the responses 
O: 
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score. The alpha reliability coefficient for these seven items is .68. 
The average inter-item correlation is .28. 
The next set of items reflects a problem-specific approach to uncer­
tainty. A battery of potential oroblems was identified by individuals 
closely associated with or knowledgeable about cooperatives. Each poten­
tial problem is rated by the directors according to its seriousness on 
a scale from one (no problem) to five (serious problem). The 20 poten­
tial problems which directors are asked to rate are listed below: 
1. public/consumer relations 
2. competition from other cooperatives 
3. competition from noncooperative businesses 
4. dominance by regional cooperatives 
5. obtaining energy supplies 
6. availability of transportation 
7. recruiting new cooperative members 
8. retaining old cooperative members 
9. obtaining quality personnel 
10. marketing cooperative products 
11. technological changes 
12. urban encroachment 
13. corporate control of agriculture 
14. national economic conditions 
15. changes in cooperative enabling legislation 
16. availability of credit 
17. government legislation related to farm price programs 
18. government legislation related to production controls 
1Q . qovpr"nTnpn r " Pgi  s"  Art  on Atec to creG?li :  oul lc ley 
20. government legislation related to environmental and safety 
regulations 
This list was generated through study of the literature, current events 
and discussions with persons knowledgeable about cooperatives. As a 
check on the content validity of this list of problems, the directors 
were asked to indicate the two most serious problems currently facing 
their cooperative. The most frequent responses, in order, are: trans-
4 ^ 1 c All ^ •-r-.o 9 n 1 i c ^  3 mo-n — 
cloned by some cirectors as among the top two proble-s currently facing 
f-n <31 t nnr\r\ci-rpt1-i . 
55 
A suiranated score is calculated for these 20 dimensions for each 
respondent. The alpha reliability coefficient for the grain elevator 
cooperatives is .85 with an inter-item correlation of .22. The alpha 
reliability coefficient the rural electric cooperatives is .35 i-rith 
an inter-item correlation of .21. These reliability coefficients indi­
cate consistency among the respondents about the order of seriousness 
of the problems. The responses are also aggregated by cooperative to 
obtain a board score for problem-specific uncertainty. 
Linkages 
Linkages are measured on two levels: individual (director) link­
ages and organization (cooperative or board) linkages. On the first 
level, the concern is with the number of memberships which individual 
directors have in various organizations: (1) general farm organiza­
tions, (2) farm commodity organizations, (3) cooperatives, and (4) local, 
nonagricultural organizations such as civic, political, educational, 
social and fraternal organizations. In the data analysis, these four 
categories may be considered alone or summated for a total linkages 
score. 
The list of general farm and commodity organizations is provided 
in the questionnaire which is reproduced in Appendix A. The commodity 
organization memberships are legitimate "bridges to exteriority" 
(Mueller, 1979:1). One way in which boards combat excessive "inferior­
ity" is to open the boundary of the board to provide human linkages 
with other nonconflicting organizations and domains of human endeavor. 
In some organizations, this may be accomplished through responsible 
stewardship of "outside" directors engaged in primary; career activity 
in other domains of concern to the organization, such as another eco­
nomic sector or educational, public or social activity. In the case 
cooperatives, this might be accomplished by the involvemei.t of the 
directors themselves in diverse external activities. It aooears that 
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linkages in favor of the directors of grain elevators who are farmers, 
but this will be addressed later. 
Individual linkages serve as a means of gathering information. 
They are also a measure of the "exteriority" of directors. In one sense, 
these linkages reflect an information view of the environment. They may 
also reflect a resource dependence view, if information is interpreted 
as a resource. As with several other concepts, individual linkages are 
aggregated for each cooperative in order to obtain a measure of board 
linkages. This aggregated measure of individual linkages fits more 
clearly into the resource dependence perspective. 
Linkages are also approached on the organizational level. On this 
level, there are two dimensions. The first is the number of organiza­
tions in which the cooperative has membership or affiliation. This 
information was provided on the information sheet completed by the 
cooperative managers (Appendix B). 
The second measure of organizational linkages is derived by summing 
the number of professionals and consultants hired by the board. This 
admittedly indirect measure of linkages is intended as a proxy measure 
of "external or outside" directors. Since cooperatives are prohibited 
from having voting nonmembers on their boards, hired professionals and 
consultants might ser-ve in some capacity in lieu of "outside" direc­
tors. These business professionals and consultants include the follow­
ing: auditor, attorney, business management consultant and 'other 
business professionals" specified by the manager. 
Traditionalism 
Traditionalism is measured by responses to a single statement: 
"Cooperatives should function according to the traditional principles 
of cooperation." Directors were asked to respond to this statement on 
a five-point scale ranging from one (strongly agree) to five (strongly 
disagree). Several other attitudinal questions were intended to measure 
traditionalism, but these items produced very low inter-item correla­
tions and realiability coefficients. This single item was adopted as 
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the best measure of traditionalism because it refers to the best known 
ideology of cooperatives: the traditional (Rochdale) principles of 
cooperation. I-Jhile some directors might not be able to cite these prin­
ciples , it is unlikel'^'' th?t ^ny not reference to them. 
Competition 
Competition within trade area is assumed to increase director 
uncertainty and organizational linkages. However, competition was 
operationalized on the organizational level only. The managers of each 
cooperative were asked to indicate (1) the number of cooperative compet­
itors within their trade area and (2) the number of noncooperative com­
petitors within their trade area. Level of competition thus corresponds 
to the actual numbers provided by tne managers. Cooperative and non-
cooperative competitors are kept distinct as two separate measures of 
competition. It is a resource dependence idea that competition might 
increase uncertainty. It is also assumed that competition might 
increase the perception of uncertainty, although perceptions may be 
less important in a highly competitive market (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 
1976:92) .  
Organizational Type and Structure 
Type is oper^tized by ni Rring;n shing the rural electric from 
the grain elevator cooperatives. Several structural concepts are also 
used. The first, organizaLional size, is measured by (1) annual dollar 
volume of business and (2) number of cooperative members. The second, 
age of the cooperative, is measured by years since incorporation. The 
third, tenure of manager, is the number of years the organization has 
been served by the current manager. These data were provided by the 
cooperative managers. 
Uncercaincy and ics correlates will be examined first, on both the 




In this chapter, data will be presented to test relationships out­
lined in Chapter II. In the first section, the focus is on the corre­
lates of two measures of uncertainty. Correlations are calculated on 
both the individual and the aggregate (board) level. In the second 
section, the focus shifts to linkages and the analysis is restricted to 
the organizational level. 
Uncertainty and its Correlates 
Two Pleasures of uncertainty are employed. The first is an informa­
tion view which reflects the conditions which impact the ability of 
directors to make decisions. The second is a problem-specific approach 
to uncertainty. In both cases, a series of items are summed in order to 
obtain an overall measure- The operationalization of these concepts was 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
The Components 
The components of the two summated measures are of interest in 
themselves. Therefore, before analyzing overall uncertainty correlates, 
the individual items will De analyzes. rnese items are subjected to a 
one-way analysis of variance by type of cooperative. This ser\'es the 
dual purpose of illustrating the relative importance of the components 
and major contrasts between the rural electric cooperatives and the 
grain elevator cooperatives. 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty The questions measuring 
perceived environmental uncertainty were of the general form ''How often 
L1WC5 • • • c: ^  1. C V. L. UllC U—CliiO lUCiVJ-C uy UiiC L/ WCIA. u. . JvsCO y witVACti r, o.,. 
on a scale from one (never) to five (often). The sources of this type 
of uncertainty are listed in Table 4 in order from most Co least impor-
diiu uiic r 2» i_ci ; X v_ cs-ttu. uiic j_c: v c j_ w u/1. c a. j-j. u-y ci ^  v/v o a. o. ji. a. * 
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Table 4. Components of perceived environmental uncertainty measures by 
type of cooperative 
GRAIN RURAL 
V nj. wi\C> X i\J. v_»«J V i-.A>uc-u_ix 
SOURCE OF UNCERTAINTY 
Changes in government 
policies and regulations. 
Need to gather informa­
tion from external 
person or organization. 
Rapid and unpredictable 
change in farm economy. 
Rapid and unpredictable 
change in general economy. 
Changes in social, eco­
nomic and political condi­
tions outside cooperative. 
Uncertainty about results 
of board decisions. 
2.65 5 3.47 1 3.11 95.1 <.0001 
3.39  1  2 .34  4  2 .92  195.6  ( .0001 
3.36 3 2.37 3 2.92 182.9 <.0001 
3.05 4 2.17 5 2.66 109.8 <.0001 
2.58  6  2 .01  6  2 .32  66 .2  < .0001 
Lack of knowledge of 
competitors' actions. 2.57  7  1 .88  7  2 .26  94 .5  < .000:  
competition is perceived as having the least impact on boards' cecisions; 
ci"iôfi^0s xii ^cvcitruncric pca.^cil£3 a.ng ^ incst» 
The evaluations of each source by rural elecrric directors and 
grain elevator directors vary considerably. The differences are statis-
i- 4 r» a 1 ci CT)": f i fh 5^ h i ah 1 ovn 1 DT 1 i fv. Thp P'TAJS.i'gA t 
difference concerns the impact of changes in the farm economy (F=195-6). 
This question was worded unfortunately since, by their very purpose, 
•4-"U o r' ^  T» 4 o 1 'îi-'Tp •-/-N-v-o "U o /-» r> o T-T-I ri T.t-' •^VI T a -r-r? ca r» nrTV "nr^ T.r— 
ever, this source was still ranked as the fourth most salient by the 
directors of the rural electric cooperatives. inis indicates char chese 
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rural electric cooperatives and their directors are embedded in a farm 
economy, even though not as directly as the grain elevator cooperatives. 
Despite the extreme difference on the individual uncertainty indi­
cators between rural electrics and grain cooperatives, the summated 
uncertainty score does not differ by type of cooperative, even though 
in six of seven cases the grain elevator directors are more uncertain. 
This seeming anomaly is explained by the extreme impact which government 
policies and regulations appear to have on the rural electric coopera­
tives . 
certainty The cooperative directors were 
provided with a list of 20 potential problems and asked to rank each 
according to the extent to which it is currently a problem on a scale 
from one (no problem) to five (serious problem). These problem-specific 
sources of uncertainty are listed in Table 5 from most to least impor­
tant overall source of uncertainty. Rankings and mean scores, obtained 
from a one-way analysis of variance, are also provided for each type of 
cooperative. 
Government safety and environmental regulations top the list as 
the most serious problem currently faced by the cooperatives. These 
regulations are the most serious problem for the rural electrics and 
the second most serious problem for the grain elevator cooperati'^''es-
Transportation, the most serious problem currently facing the grain 
elevators, is ranked twelfth by che rural electric cooperatives. Trans­
portation constitutes the most extreme difference between the two types 
of cooperatives. The difference is, of course, statistically signifi­
cant. Ratings which differ at a statistically significant level «.05) 
betwRpn rural electrics and grain elevators are indicated by an asterisk 
in Table 5. 
It is notable that the problems which relate co farm-specific areas 
(such as farm price programs and corporate control of agriculture) are 
ranked quite similarly by rural electric and by grain elevator direc­
tors. This fur cher suDDorcs che argumant that the rural electric 
61 
Table 5. Components of problem-specific uncertainty measure by type of 
cooperative 
GRAIN RURAL 
T»TT *rT»/-ST-»0 "W- /-ir—, , T- /^TT"p T) ^ T T ijxjij V r\x wivD ilijUJjOi x\.x v>0 
POTENTIAL PROBLEM MEAN RANK MEAN RANK MEAN 
Government Safety and Environmental 
Regulations 3. 85 2 4. 33 1 3. 96* 
Availability of Transportation 3. 96 1 2. 59 12 3. 64* 
National Economic Conditions 2 56 3 3. 83 2 3. 62* 
Obtaining Energy Supplies 3. 47 4 3. 63 3 3. 51 
Changes in Enabling Legislation 3. 25 5 3. 44 4 3. 29 
Government Credit Policies 2. 95 10 3. 43 5 3. 06* 
Government Farm Price Programs 3. 07 7 2. 98 6 3. 05 
Government Production Controls 2. 97 9 2. 96 7 2. 97 
Obtaining Quality Personnel 3. 00 8 2. 74 10 2. 94* 
Competition from Noncooperatives 3. 11 6 2. 29 15 2. 91* 
Technological Changes 2. 77 12 2. 74 9 2. 76 
Public/Consumer Relations 2. 61 13 2. 63 11 2. ,61 
Availability of Credit 2. 53 14 2. ,81  8 2. .60*  
r ' r > t r t r > o + • • ! * + "  t f - - î  2. ,80  12 1. 51 20 2. .49*  
Corporate Control of Agriculture 2. , 51 15 2. , 35 14 , 47 
2 = ,49 16 1 .76 17 2. 
Marketing Cooperative Products 2. 45 19 1, .70 18 2, .27*  
Urban Encroachment 2, .18  18 2. 51 13 2, .26*  
Dominance by Regional Cooperatives 2. 20 17 2. 09 16 2, .17*  
Retaining Old Members . 87 20 . 53 19 1 .79 
Indicates significant difference at .05 level or greater between 
rural electric cooperative and grain elevator cooperatives. 
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cooperatives and their directors are embedded in a rural, farm-based 
social and economic environment. 
When the 20 uncertainty rankings are summed, the directors of the 
n.ir?! electric cooperatives score significantly (p=.033) higher on 
uncertainty. This contrasts with the previous information-related view 
of uncertainty in which the directors of the grain elevator cooperatives 
were somewhat (although not significantly) more uncertain. 
Uncertainty and Linkages 
Individual level linkages consist of memberships which individual 
directors have in (1) general farm organizations, (2) farm commodity 
organizations, (3) cooperatives, and (4) local, nonagricultural organi­
zations, such as civic, political, educational, social and fraternal 
organizations. Past and present directorships of cooperative and non-
cooperative organizations is also included as another measure of link­
ages. Two measures of organizational linkages are also used: (1) 
cooperative organizational memberships and affiliations and (2) business 
professionals and consultants hired by the board. 
The effect of organizational type will be controlled throughout the 
data analysis. However, before proceeding, some key differences between 
rural electric and grain elevator cooperatives will be reviewed. These 
f o-roTi 1-01703 l<=n i r, p onp—wsv anal vy ly ui vài'iaûûê bv tVDc of 
cooperative. First of all, the directors of the rural electric coopera­
tives have more board experience than the directors of the grain ele­
vator cooperatives. Second, die directors of the rural electric cooper-
> mT*Ci individual organizational linkages. This is 
interesting because it was mentioned earlier that the list of commodity 
organizations in the questionnaire might bias the total number of link­
ages in favor of the grain elevator directors. In fact, the directors 
of the rural electrics have more total memberships in farm commodity 
organizations. This is understandable when it is recognized that all 
but two of the directors of the rural electrics are farmers earning at 
least 75 percent of their income from farming. 
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Third, on the organizational level, the grain elevators have more 
cooperative organizational memberships whereas the rural electrics hire 
more business professionals and consultants. Furthermore, the rural 
electrics have managers with greater tenure and are much more likely to 
have formal plans and procedures for communicating with members. 
Although type of cooperative will be taken into account throughout the 
data analysis, these differences should be kept in mind. 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty Zero-order correlations are 
calculated between perceived environmental uncertainty (the first mea­
sure) and linkages on three levels: the individual level, the board 
level, and the organizational level. The board level consists largely 
of individual level data aggregated by cooperative. First-order partial 
correlatioas are also calculated controlling for type of cooperative. 
Individual Director Linkages In addition to "organizational 
linkages" in which the four categories listed above are summated (gen­
eral farm organizations, farm commodity organizations, cooperatives, and 
local, nonagricultural organizations), three additional correlates 
include (1) board experience—past and present directorships in coopera­
tive and noncooperative organizations; (2) cooperative memberships—a 
subset of organizational linkages; and (3) local, nonagricultural orga­
nizational ïïieinbershiïjs—ariotuer SubseL of or^anizaLional liiikaies. 
The two subsets—coop memberships and local, nonagricultural orga­
nization memberships—are weakly associated with perceived environmental 
(organizational linkages) is more strongly associated with perceived 
environmental uncertainty. Tne correlations are provided in Table 6. 
Cop ll"'* r-3 Tr-.T fypp i n g f ZTS t —OTCET COrT-SlH ui-OHS d08S HO-I 
appreciably alter the associations. The direction of the associations 
is such that linkages are positively associated with uncertainty. Thus 
ual linkages and the first measure of uncertainty are positively corre-
lacec. 
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Board Linkages Perceived environmental uncertainty and the 
individual measures of linkages are aggregated by board and the same 
relations are tested using zero-order correlations and first-order 
partiels^ controlling for type. Only the total linkages measure (orga­
nizational linkages) and board experience are aggregated. Once again, 
board experience is not related to perceived environmental uncertainty. 
The positive correlation between perceived uncertainty and organiza­
tional linkages holds on the aggregated level. Ar.l once again, control­
ling for type of cooperative does not appreciably alter the relation. 
The correlation coefficients are higher, but the probability is lower, 
which reflects the smaller n. 
Cooperative Linkages Cooperative linkages consist of 
external organizational connections, Ttjo measures are used. The first 
consists of the memberships which cooperatives have in other organiza­
tions; the second consists of the sum of external professionals and 
consultants employed by the board. This measure assumes that while 
cooperative boards may not legally have "outside" directors, the uncer­
tainty reducing function of "outside" directors might be filled by 
auditors, attorneys or other business professionals who might be hired 
by the board. Only the first measure—cooperative organizational mem-
nerships—is signficantly associated with the first measure of uncer­
tainty (Table 6). As with the individual linkages, organizational 
(cooperative) linkages are associated wieh greater uncertainty—opposite 
of the direction hypothesized. 
? roblem-Specific Uncertainty Identical zero-order and first-
order partial correlations are calculated for the problem-specific 
measure of uncertainty. The resulting correlations and their levels 
of significance are also reported in Table 6. 
Individual Director Linkages All of the measures cf indi­
vidual linkages have statistically significant zero-order correlations 
•1 OTN o t-'T-j^/ti'T-T-oTT-vT-Tr PoT-ir-T-r^l'-ÎT-Ycr f my •r\r'no -r n -rm i en r n 
— ^ ^ ^ ^  ^  ^  ^ r\y-\ 4- ft a c a — 
tiens. ~ 
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Table 6. Sunmairy of zero-order correlations and first-order partial 
correlations (controlling for type) between measures of 




LINKAGES ZERO-ORDER FIRST-ORDER ZERO-ORDER FIRST-ORDER 
INDIVIDUAL LINKAGES 
Directors (n=443) 
1. Organizational r = .132 r = .131 r = .225 r = .217 
Linkages p = .003 p = .004 p = .001 p = .001 
2. Board Experience ns^ ns r = .134 r = =114 
p = .005 p = .016 
3. Coop Memberships r = .084 r = .081 r = .260 r = .247 
p = .046 p = .051 p = .001 p = .001 
4. Local Nonagricul- r = .092 r - .091 r = .148 r = .139 
tural Organizations p = .049 p = .052 p = .008 p = .011 
Boards (n=117) 
1. Organizational r = .191 r = .193 r = .355 r = .320 
Linkages p = .022 p - .022 p = .001 p = .001 
2. Board Experience ns ns r = .297 r = .227 
P = .001 p = .009 
COOPERATIVE LINKAGES (n=117) 
1. Coop Memberships r = .127 r = .171 ns ns 
P = .09 p = .036 
2. Employed Professionals ns ns ns ns 
'Nonsignificant. 
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previous measure of uncertainty. Their direction is consistent with 
the previous measures, such that problem-specific uncertainty is posi­
tively associated with individual director linkages. Once again, the 
direction of the association that was hypothesized does not hold. 
Board Linkages As with the previous measure of uncertainty, 
problem-specific uncertainty is aggregated by board. Zero-order and 
first-order partial correlations are calculated for this aggregate 
measure of uncertainty and the aggregate linkage measures. This proce­
dure yields the strongest correlations yet obtained—somewhat stronger 
for organizational linkages than for board experience. The relation 
holds, at a slightly lower magnitude, after controlling for type. 
Cooperative Linkages Neither cooperative organizational 
affiliations and memberships nor the external professionals employed 
by the boards are associated with the aggregated measure of problem-
specific uncertainty. 
Summary of Linkage Correlates Both measures of uncertainty are 
correlated with the measures of linkages, but in an opposite direction 
than expected. Linkages are associated with greater uncertainty. The 
problem-specific measure is a more concrete assessment of uncertainty 
and this may be the reason for the stronger correlations. However, 
such an interpretation is largely speculative. It should be noted that 
the correlations are of a weak magnitude (the strongest of all is .35). 
The general lev magnitude of the correlation coefficients will place 
some constraints on the interpretation of the data. 
Uncertainty and Comoetition 
The cooperative managers provided estimates of the number of 
cooperative and ncncocperativs competitors with tj-hirh thpir cooperative 
is involved. Competition is measured on only the organizational level. 
Zero-order correlations between two levels of competition and the two 
measures of uncertainty are extremely small (Table 7). First-order 
partial correlations, controlling for type, are likewise quite insignif­
icant. Thus, the second hypothesis rhar level of compecicior; will be 
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positively related to uncertainty does not hold; there appears to be no 
notable relation between perceptions of uncertainty and level of cooper­
ative competition. 
Uncertainty and Size 
The cooperative managers also provided information on annual dollar 
volume of business and number of cooperative members. These two figures 
are used as measures of size. Correlations are calculated on the orga­
nizational level so as to control for possible bias introduced by the 
large variance in number of directors per cooperative if the analysis 
were conducted with the individual as the unit of analysis. 
The correlations of the size measures with the first measure of 
uncertainty are insignificant (Table 7). A negative zero-order correla­
tion between dollar volume of business and problem-specific uncertainty 
is reduced considerably after controlling for type. The zero-order 
correlation between number of members and problem-specific uncertainty 
is quite small but increases after controlling for type of cooperative. 
Problem-specific uncertainty is greatest in cooperatives with fewer 
members. However, these correlations are weak and should be interpreted 
with caution. 
Uncertainty and Traditionalism 
Traditionalism was measured by a single item on a Likerr-rype 
scale. Directors were asked to respond to the statement; "Cooperatives 
should function according to the traditional principles of cooperation." 
Correlations are insignificant in the case of the first measure of 
uncertainty, but significant in the case of problem-specific uncer­
tainty (Table 7). The direction of the relation is such that uncer-
tainy is associated with low levels of traditionalism. In this case, 
the expected relation was obtained. However, the correlations are of 
a quite weak magnitude. 
The correlates of two measures of uncertainty have been examined. 
Both are perceptual measures derived from individual level attitudinal 
data. Generally, individual but not organizational linkages are 
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Table 7. Zero-order and first-order partial correlations (controlling 
for type) between measures of uncertainty and competition, 







correlate ZERO-ORDER FIRST-ORDER ZERO-ORDER FIRST-ORDER 
Competition 
Cooperative Competitors .029 
Independent Competitors .035 
Size 
Dollar Volume of Business .025 
Number of Members -.055 
Traditionalism (Should -.01 
cooperatives function 
according to the tra­
ditional principles?) 
.039 -.056 .041 
.038 -.055 -.016 
.033 .042 .031 
-.081 .029 -.14 
-.007 -.099* -.119 
p=.031 p=.012 
"Levels of probability reported only for those correlations signif­
icant ac Lne -Gj xevej. ujT xcSS . 
associated with uncertainty. Perceptions of uncertainty correlate 
slightly with traditionalism, but not at all with organizational mea­
sures of competition and size. 
T n  the n p - x-r sfirtion. the analysis shifts from the perceptual to 
the organizational plane. Correlates of linkages will be examined on 
the organizational level. At tnis point, it is assumed that linkages 
have advantages for the organization as outlined by the resource depen­
dence perspective, independent of che reduction in the perception of 
uncerraznry. 
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Cooperative Linkages and Correlates 
In this section, linkages are viewed as an organizational attri­
bute—a property of the organization, not directors. Correlates will be 
examined for three types of linkages: (1) board member organizational 
linkages; (2) cooperative organizational linkages; and (3) cooperative 
external linkages. Board member organizational linkages consist of 
individual director organizational memberships and affiliations. 
Cooperative organizational linkages consist of organizational member­
ships and affiliations of the cooperative. Cooperative external link­
ages consist of business professionals and consultants employed by the 
board. These measures are identical to the linkages measures used 
in the previous section of the data analysis. 
Zero-Order Correlations 
Zero-order correlations are calculated first between the three 
measures of linkages—board member organizational linkages, cooperative 
organizational linkages and cooperative external linkages—and seven 
organizational variables. These variables include: type of cooperative, 
tenure of manager, age of cooperative (years since incorporation), 
number of members of cooperative, annual dollar volume of business of 
cooperative, number of cooperative competitors, and number of indepen­
dent competitors. The results are discussed below according to the 
UiOClO \J.X. C . 
Board Member Organizational Linkages This linkage measure is an 
aggregate of individual directors' organizational memberships and affil­
iations. It is essentially the same measure used previously. The zero-
order correlations between this linkage measure and the seven organiza­
tional variables are provided in Table 8. At the organizational level, 
LilCll ) UJVC L/ 1. U WU y C J. O. L. u. V c _i.O O .i. J..;. J. c-O O \_/v-^ v_ sj. 
ages. The rural electric cooperative boards have the greatest number 
cf organizational linkages. Volume of business and number of indepen-
•j o ^ -V- o of- n T.To -3 C» T" "f-n -n c ^  1~-• \7'(^ 
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Cooperative Organi zational Linkages This linkage measure con­
sists of the number of other organizations with which the cooperative 
has membership or affiliation. Tenure of manager (years with coopera­
tive) and type of cooperative are strongly correlated with cooperative 
organizational memberships and affiliations (Table 8). The direction of 
the relation is such that cooperatives with fewer years of manager 
tenure have considerably more organizational connections. Grain eleva­
tors also have more organizational memberships and affiliations than do 
the rural electric cooperatives. In a word, they are better integrated. 
Remember, however, that as individuals, the rural electric directors are 
better integrated. Number of cooperative members is negatively associ­
ated with this measure of linkages (the fewer members, the more connec­
tions) , 
Number of cooperative competitors and, to a lesser degree, the 
number of independent competitors is positively (and significantly) 
correlated with linkages, as is volume of business. Age of cooperative 
(years since incorporation) is negatively associated. Although the 
relationship is somewhat weak, younger cooperatives tend to have more 
linkages. Younger cooperatives would include new organizations formed 
outright and new organizations resulting from merger or consolidation. 
All seven of the organizational variables which are specified are sig­
nificantly associated with this measure of linkages. 
oOCuciTS.uj»Vc lLXu£TT15.J_ i-ixn.rC3.§c5 UCOpcTauZVc J_3,rirCo§SS CGIi 
sist of the number of professionals and other business consultants 
employed by the board. Tenure of manager and age of cooperative show 
fairly strong, negative correlations with this measure, i.e., newer 
cooperatives with newer managers have the most linkages (Table 8). Both 
correlations are negative. Number of cooperative members and annual 
uuj-xdj- V vi. u U2> ciJ.6 p US) JL L Ï-Vê j_jr' w ui: 
the most cooperative competitors also have more linkages. Type is 
TNR\/^OT*3-RO"T7 acoo/^-î p?-on T.TT r-n -r r\ -io mooci*"r*o f "-îr>U'S30FOC T -m -r "n "i c /-«ssc o 
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Table 8. Zero-order correlations between three linkage measures and 
organizational attributes 
BOARD COOPERATIVE COOPERATIVE 
CORRELATE: LINKA.GES ORGANIZATIONS EXTERNAL LINKS 
Volume of Business r = -.154 .319 .216 
n = 110 110 110 
p = .053 .001 .011 
Number of Members r = -.075 -.415 .370 
n = 100 100 100 
p = .228 .001 .001 
Age of Cooperative r = .084 -.174 -.317 
n = 108 108 108 
p = .192 .035 .001 
Tenure of Manager r = .028 -.619 -.439 
n - 106 106 106 
p = .388 .001 .001 
Type of Cooperative r = .256 -.614 .174 
t i n  t i n  
p = .003 .001 .033 
Cooperative Competition r = .045 .408 .259 
n = 94 94 94 
P ~ • UUJ- • uu3 
L64 .205 .130 
95 95 95 
,056 .022 .101 
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Of the seven variables, only the number of independent competitors does 
not correlate with linkages at a statistically significant level. 
First-Order Correlations 
Next, first-order correlations are calculated for the same varia­
bles. Type of cooperative is extracted from these correlations. This 
is done primarily because, on the individual level, type is a strong 
determinant of individual linkages. It seems that this relation may 
hold on the organizational level. The correlations will be analyzed 
in the same order as before. 
Board Member Organizational Linkages Controlling for type 
increases the strength of the relationship between number of cooperative 
members and number of cooperative competitors. However, it decreases 
the relationship between number of independent competitors and linkages 
and between volume of business and linkages. The remaining two varia­
bles—age of cooperative and tenure of manager—are changed very little 
by controlling for type (Table 9). 
Cooperative Organizational Linkages After controlling for the 
effect of type of organization, tenure of manager becomes even more 
important. The relationship between age of cooperative and this mea­
sure of linkages also increases in importance. The relationship between 
statistically significant. The correlations between linkages and volume 
r\Ç T-ii Tm'r-s o r\i- m om rs o o <4 "î-rjo t-i ^ o m t* OTTlT\ O "t" T 't'OT'Q p 7" O 
considerably and are no longer significant. Several of these relation-
Cooperative External Linkages Tenure of manager, volume of 
L ? >  r : u ~ L " r r  o z  c o o p e r a t i v e  c o T T i p e t i t o r s  ô n G  n u T H D s r  o r  m c s p s n c a n t !  
competitors all increase in importance a: 
effect of age of cooperative remains aboi 
number of cooperative members decreases slightly (Table '-ij . In this 
case, type of cooperative has little confounding influence on the 
remaining six variables. 
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Table 9. First-order partial correlations (controlling for type) between 
three linkage measures and organizational attributes 
BOARD COOPKRATIVV, COOPERATIF 
CORRELATE: LINKAGES ORGANIZATIONS EXTERNAL LINKS 
Volume of Business T — -.062 .113 .312 
n = 109 109 109 
p = 
.261  .119 .000 
Number of Members r = - .299  -.068 .338  
n = 99 99 99 
P =• .001 .249 .000 
Age of Cooperative r = .103 -.268 -.312 
n = 107 107 107 
P = .143  .002 .000 
Tenure of Manager r - -.015 -. 664 -.482 
n = 105 105 105 
P = .438  .000 .000 
Cooperative Competition r = .184  .191 .382  
93 S3 93 
p = 
. 037 .032  . 000 
Independent Competition r = - .126  .129 .165 
n = 94 94 94 
p - .110 .105  .054  
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Muiti-Variable Approach 
In order to obtain a more accurate weighting on the contribution of 
each of the seven variables to the linkage measure in question, the 
seven variables are regressed on each linkage measure. Pairwise dele­
tion of missing data is utilized because listwise deletion greatly 
reduced the number of observations and distorted the relations found 
with the original zero-order correlations. The results will be dis­
cussed in the same order as before (Table 10). 
Board Member Organizational Linkages The seven variables 
explain only 24 percent of the variance in board member organizational 
linkages. Type is the most important contributor. As noted earlier, 
the rural electric boards have the most linkages. Number of members, 
cooperative competitors, and age of cooperative also contribute some­
what. Volume of business is a function of type only. In all, this 
linkage measure is not well-explained by the organizational variables. 
Cooperative Organizational Linkages The seven variables explain 
70 percent of the variance in this linkages measure. Tenure contributes 
the most, followed by type. The direction of these correlations are 
notable. Tenure of manager, type of cooperative, number of members, and 
age of cooperative are negatively associated with cooperative organiza­
tional linkages. That is, grain elevators, cooperatives with less mana­
ger tenure, with fewer members, and younger organizations have more 
r r  ^ - î  r \ r ^  o  i  1  c :  ( y  " y  i7/-\ : i iTno /~vT pTt n t-ii fTnpv a"»" o T r> 
petitors are positively associated with cooperative organizational link­
ages. 
Cooperative External Linkages The seven variables combine to 
 ^C X. 1.1 U W UllO V O JL.  ^O-i. X C V X llC* C.O 
(number of professionals and business consultants employed by the 
cooperative). Although rural electrics tend to have more linkages of 
this sort, type contributes the least of all variables to this measure. 
I'o ^ dc r\r> i- ^ i i- r\ir r-» 
order, by number of niembers. cooperative con^ezicors. age of coopéra-
tive^ independent competitors snd volume of business-
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Table 10. Regression of seven organizational variables 






Type of Cooperative .256 .065 117 
Number of Members .385 .149 107 
Cooperative Competitors .465 .216 96 
Age of Cooperative .489 .239 115 
Independent Competitors .490 .241 97 
Tenure of Manager .491 .241 113 
Volume of Business a a 117 
Cooperative Organizational Linkages 
Tenure of Manager .619 .383 113 
Type of Cooperative .807 .652 117 
Volume of Business .833 .694 117 
Number of Members .834 .696 107 
Cooperative Competitors .835 .697 96 
Independent Competitors .835 .698 97 
Age of Cooperative . 836 . 698 115 
Cooperative External Linkages 
. '^39 . 193 113 
Number of Members .673 .452 107 
Cooperative Competitors .716 .513 96 
A CO r\r 
.729 .512 115 
Independent Competitors .735 .541 97 
Volume of Business .740 . 548 117 
f O ^  ^ "T TO 
.743 , 553 117 
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The seven organizational variables explain only 24 percent of the 
variance in board member organizational linkages. Type explains the 
most with the rural electric boards having the most linkages. The seven 
variables explain 70 percent of the variance in coonerative organiza­
tional linkages (organizational memberships and affiliations). Tenure 
of manager and type contribute the most. Tenure of manager also contrib­
utes the most to the explanation of cooperative external linkages. The 
seven variables together explain 55 percent of the variance. It will be 
recalled that this is the surrogate measure for "outside" directors. In 




The goal of this final chapter is to summarize the empirical infor­
mation presented, to draw implications from the results, and to suggest 
directions for further inquiry. First, the results of the correlations 
calculated on the individual level with the uncertainty measures and 
those calculated on the organizational level with the linkages measures 
will be reviewed. Implications of the findings for the research problem, 
decision making and organizational autonomy in an increasingly exter­
nally controlled environment, will be drawn. The findings will also be 
related to the theoretical perspectives. Finally, the need for a more 
comprehensive approach to the study of cooperatives and their boards of 
directors will be discussed. Scope must be increased in order to 
develop a theory of cooperatives for the 1980s (Edick et al., 1980). 
Results of the Data Analysis 
In the first section of the data analysis, individual (but not orga­
nizational) linkages and, to a lesser extent, traditionalism were found 
to be significantly associated with two measures of uncertainty. Orga­
nizational measures, such as cornpprTrion ann size nf rnnperArivA. '^'ere 
not related to uncertainty. 
The correlations were strongest in the case of the problem-specific 
measure of uncertainty. This measure is a more concrete approach to 
uncertainty and also has a higher alpha reliability coefficient than 
the first, information-related measure. Despite this, the measures 
yielded some similar results. Both measures revealed that the directors 
are most sensitive to government policies, regulations and legislation. 
Cf seven sources of uncertainty, the directors overall agree chat 
changes in government policies and regulations most often affect board 
decisions (Table 4). The rural electric directors are most sensitive 
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power plants and power rate structures. Five of the top eight problem-
specific sources of uncertainty were also related to government policies, 
regulations and legislation (Table 5). Government safety and environ­
mental regulations are the single most salient overall source of uncer­
tainty. In the case of the rural electrics, this would undoubtedly 
include regulations governing power plants and, in the case of grain 
cooperatives, regulations such as grain dust standards. 
Aspects of the economy—local and national—also loom large in both 
approaches to uncertainty. On the other hand, competition has the least 
effect on board decisions. Even as a problem-specific aspect of uncer­
tainty, competition is not rated especially highly. 
Correlations were not in the hypothesized direction. Linkages were 
found to be associated with high levels of perceived uncertainty. The 
conclusion is not that linkages are dysfunctional in uncertain environ­
ments but, rather, that individual linkages are associated with greater 
perception of uncertainty among these cooperative directors. As acknowl­
edged in the presentation of the theoretical hypotheses, there is a 
rationale for expecting the relationship discovered to obtain. And, 
certainly, the findings are consistent with common sense. By virtue of 
their exteriority—their linkages wich other organizational environments 
—directors with the most external organizational connections have 
greater awareness of the complexity of their operating milieu (Mueller, 
1979). While perhaps not reducing uncertainty^ these linkages contrib­
ute to board knowledge and decisions. 
It was seen in Chapter II that cooperatives exist in a highly uncer­
tain environment relative to many other organizations as a consequence 
of factors such as organizational density, level of competition, inter­
mediate concentration, and the volatility of the agricultural economy. 
zations in uncertain environments to form linkages with significant 
external organizations. By entering into transactions with orher orga­
nizations; cooperatives ^ay obtain resources that they are unable to 
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environment of the cooperative is an interorganizational network, then 
resources are obtained and uncertainty is reduced through the management 
of crucial interdependencies. 
For this reason, organizational linkages were next examined based 
on the belief that linkages might reduce objective uncertainty, although 
perhaps not the perception of uncertainty. Such a conclusion is consis­
tent with the resource dependence view that under some conditions per­
ceptions are not important. For example, if an organization is severely 
constrained by the environment, as in a ver}' competitive market, then 
perceptions may be less important (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976:92). It 
is also consistent with an ecological view which would place little or no 
emphasis on perceptions. Although organizational variables were 
generally not associated with the perceptual measures of uncertainty, 
the assumption was retained that cooperatives exist in a highly uncer­
tain environment and that, in keeping with resource dependence theory-, 
organizational linkages might serve to reduce objective uncertainty. 
The next step, then, was to examine organizational correlates of 
linkages. Board member linkages is an aggregated measure of individual 
director organizational memberships and affiliations. Seven variables 
explained only 24 percent of the variance in this measure. The greatest 
contributor was type of cooperative with rural electric boards having 
uiic ^ J-ccx ucio L. iLLiiuu/ c S-'J- V o-N-i j_ j-a-i.trvo.^c;o • 
The next two linkage measures were organizational level measures— 
cooperative organizational linkages (the number of memberships and 
affiliations which the organization has) and external board linkages 
\ L. i i .i. c/ -U. O U- J. A. O Jw -L.O . i. 
cooperative). The seven variables explained, respectively, 70 percent 
and 55 percent of the variance in the two linkages measures. Most 
surprising was the contribution of tenure of manager to linkages. In 
both cases, tenure of manager was the greatest contributor to linkages. 
The direction of the relations was such that cooperatives with fewer 
years of manager tenure had a greater number of linkages. This rela­
tion was not a function of size or tvne of coooerative. 
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Implications of Results for 
Research Problem and Theory 
The research problem was how can boards make quality decisions and 
preserve organizational autonomy in a rapidly changing and unpredictable 
environment which is increasingly dominated by extra-local forces. The 
literature review focused on the role of the board as a boundary spanning 
unit, a function often filled informally in small, less complex organiza­
tions operating in homogeneous, although unstable, environments. The 
function of the board as a boundary spanning unit is to help the cooper­
ative adjust to exogenous variables (Thompson, 1967). 
Data support the assumption that these local cooperatives are 
dominated by extra-local forces and that internal considerations are 
less salient. For example, the first eight problems in Table 5 are 
clearly beyond local control. Most of the problems which are subject 
to local control, which are administrative concerns, or even which 
involve interorganizational relations are in the bottom half of the 
table. This supports the conclusion that the macro and aggregate 
environments (Osborn and Hunt, 1974)—or the causal texture (Terreberry, 
1968) is becoming increasingly important, even relative to the inter­
organizational field. 
Linkages were found to be associated with higher uncertainty. The 
likely explanation is that connections with the external environment— 
such as with other organizations—make directors more knowledgeable and 
aware of the complexity of their environment and less certain, because 
cooperatives exist in an uncertain environment. An alternative explana­
tion would be that individuals experiencing greater uncertainty engage 
in more boundary spanning activity, but that it takes time for the 
uncertainty reducing or absorbing function to occur. 
The other correlations with uncertainty—traditicr.alism, size and 
competition—were weak or nonexistent. The size of the cooperative 
does not affect director perceptions of uncertainty. Competition also 
does not affect director nerceptions of uncertainty. This is consistent 
with the weak contributD nr. which competition made to each cf the 
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uncertainty measures (Tables 4 and 5). Traditionalism was associated 
with less uncertainty, which supported the hypothesis. The correlation 
was statistically significant, but very weak, so that any interpretation 
is hazardous. This is even more the case since uncertainty was measured 
by a single item. 
On the organizational level, tenure of manager was most strongly 
associated with linkages. Two alternative explanations for this phenom­
enon, are apparent. First, less tenured managers may be more aggresive 
in their approach to management, whereas more tenured managers are more 
conservative. Second, and perhaps more likely, more tenured managers 
may have already established linkages or not need them as much as the 
less tenured manager who must establish linkages as a means of becoming 
more fully integrated into the business which he must manage. Directors 
may be best able to judge which explanation is most likely. 
The fact that more tenured managers establish fewer linkages with 
the external organizational environment has implications for the perform­
ance of cooperatives and the boundary spanning activities of boards. 
As Osborn and Hunt (1974:235) point out, the organizational leader sets 
the stage for environmental interaction and the strategy he chooses, in 
large part, determines the interaction between the organization and the 
task environment. More specifically, 
. . .  a s  c h i e f  e x e c u t i v e s  s t r e s s  i n t e r a c t i o n  w i t h  a g e n t s  i n  
the relevant environment, the probability of ascertaining 
accurate perceptions of environmental conditions and antic­
ipating needed adaptation may substantially increase. . . . 
when the unit of analysis is the organization, it is appro­
priate to view interorganizational interaction in terms of 
the chief executive's orientation toward such interaction 
and to hypothesize that it is positively associated with orga­
nizational outcomes (Osborn and Hunt. 1974:216). 
This interpretation is especially meaningful because boards of directors 
play the major role in the selection of managers. 
This interpretation of the role of managers tends to support the 
decision making perspective. The association of perceptions of uncer­
tainty with greater numbers of organizational memberships and 
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affiliations also tends to support the decision making point of view. 
That is, in uncertain environments, additional increments of information 
may increase the absolute level of uncertainty (Nystrom, 1974). However, 
these conclusions do not negate the resource dependence perspective. 
While the manager may promote and guide linkages, the linkages themselves 
are still of vital importance. Linkages may still reduce uncertainty, 
although perhaps not the perception of uncertainty. Thus, under some 
conditions, the resource dependence and decision making viewpoints may 
be reconciled. 
These results should net be regarded as conclusive, but as sugges­
tive of further inquiry. The measures of uncertainty, especially the 
first, more general approach, clearly stand in need of refinement and 
further testing before results could be conclusive. Indeed, the same 
must be said for all of the measures. Furthermore, the magnitude of 
most of the correlations was rather low. In view of these limits, and 
the limits of the organizational population, these findings are offered 
as hypotheses which might be tested in further studies of more diverse 
cooperatives. Clearly, it would be advantageous to determine the amount 
and level of linkages among cooperatives of different types, in differ­
ent geographical regions and economies, and at levels beyond locals. 
T t- t.trm c 1 c 1 1 c a f 1 1 1 *" r\ a v 4 tta tr>0pqii>'0c f t.tVi -7 /-> t-» r.r/^y t 1 
apply across several types and levels of cooperatives and between 
domain. 
The decision making perspective alone is not sufficient because of 
the critical impact of external, extra-local forces in the environment 
that set limits to organizational discretion. In order to do chis, the 
decision making perspective must be supplemented, for example, with the 
tc5g W..L cc oi. yctspcc uû-vc . 
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decision making and cooperative survival under conditions of uncertainty. 
Boundary spanning activity involves costs—perhaps giving up some auton­
omy to win greater control over essential resources—but the loss of 
organizational autonomy may be necessary for organizational survival. 
The well-being of members may require that some autonomy is sacrificed. 
A rigid ideology of grass roots control may result in organizational 
mortality. 
Suggestions for Further Inquiry 
Some support was found for the decision making and resource depen­
dence views, but much of what the ecological perspective has to offer 
was beyond the scope of the present study. Scope must be increased in 
order co develop a theory of cooperatives for the 19oGs (Edick ec al., 
1980). A theory of cooperatives would require that one (1) supplement 
cross-sectional survey data with longitudinal data; (2) focus on several 
levels of units of analysis—the individual, the department or division, 
the organization, the dyad, the organizational network, and the organi­
zational population—among organizations of the same or varying types; 
(3) use diverse perspectives alone or in combination, as in the present 
study in which three perspectives were used which can be a least par-
Lia-LJ .v i l l  LCHi  a Leu  L i i iueL  L i i é  y ,  e  i  :  e  i  d  j .  mùuè j -  u i  i i â  a  »  c  l  .  d iu .  v ^ /  
Study directors in relation uo other elements in their immediate and 
task environments—managers, personnel, members and consumers. 
j j c n ^ j - g s c o  " w g c l x g  3 . i r i " d i r g v c :  t z r i c  c j r g 5 s ~ 3 s c t l à - g r i 3 ^  c o - u s  w l i u - c i l  c l t 2  
currently available. The ecological perspective; in particular, is 
amenable to the analysis of the development of populations of organiza-
wi-ons ov0ir . Zn ^00 gr-2ssn.tz "Lt. PH.S ^22:^ BSSviP^d ^ 
• ic  TicT îDTtn T .7- Î11 r \Tn i  ri  n  a  t"  r \  o r»r»nv r \  f  f - 'no POTi r ' InQTnnc:  r  r -  s t . - ' t i  
are done so based on the assumption that the environment has become 
This research has gone beyond the case study approach and studied 
a group of organizations. Tnis is an improvement over stucies of 
uccxsxon nic-k.wj_cn2n & sj-n^xc or^&rizz&cilgr: ivnilcn gg hgc 
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generalizations. Much more can be learned by studying the organization 
dyad, the organization network and the organization population. It is 
essential to move from the organizational to interorganizational mea­
sures so that relations between cooperatives of different sizes and 
types and between cooperatives and noncooperatives might be analyzed. 
Diverse perspectives should be used alone, or in combination. In 
the present study, three perspectives were used which, it was claimed, 
could be integrated under the model of natural selection. To fully 
evaluate this model it would have been necessary to have more fully 
included the ecological dimension. This model had three elements. 
Variations occur through innovation and through the creation of new 
organizations through merger or consolidation. However, longitudinal 
data would be necessary to document the rate of merger or consolidation. 
Innovation would be more difficult to document, but estimates could be 
made through a series of cross-sectional studies. For selection to 
occur, there must be numerous variations among organizations and a high 
rate of mortality. A fairly high rate of mortality does exist for 
cooperatives, but documenting variations would require additional 
research. Finally, the postively selected variations must be preserved 
through some retention mechanism. Centralized authority of the manager. 
c. L. i. a.<a jL. L, J. w i.ia. J 
as retention mechanisms. However, each of these would tend to be mal-
s-GS-puo-Vc xij. zriG j-cng run dccsusg cncy TTiXgn'c pT3V3rzt r^inovEtixoriS 
necessary to insure future survival. 
Finally, it would be helpful to study directors in relation to 
other key elements in their immediate, task and aggregate environments. 
A study conducted concurrently with managers, directors and members 
would reveal a great deal about roles and role expectations. Inter-
W Xm 1 L  ^a I— ^ KmJ L X d  ^ O L/  ^W C CZ i i ^  ^W Ju ^  ^  ^ w & & C* ^  ^  .A* SW* >«• ' w 4^ 
tives would be instructive regarding dependency relations. And studies 
conducted with directors and with consumers would determine what direc-
tzctc b" 3 2.1.0''.'^ s -'*^0 rr t-» o >-o j_ t\ijx 22(2 ^ un at-
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If current trends continue, cooperatives that survive into the 
next decades will be fewer in number and larger in size (French et al., 
1980:236-237). They will exist in a more unstable and more heterogeneous 
environment. W>i_en a cooperative has nine to ten employees, its struc­
ture becomes more formal (Evers et al., 1976) . As cooperatives grow in 
size, they are more likely to establish functionally differentiated 
boundary-spanning units. At such a time, some of the responsibility 
for boundary spanning activities may shift from informal units, such as 
the board, to formal units. Until then, boards will continue to fulfill 
a vital representative function. 
Meanwhile, organizations facing uncertainty will seek to reduce or 
absorb it by establishing strategic linkages with the environment and 
thus stabilizing relations. However, independence itself can crcatc 
uncertainty because of difficulties in coordinating activities (Pffefer 
and Salancik, 1978:42). Interconnectedness itself may result in prob­
lems. It is paradoxical that while organizations facing uncertainty 
may increase interdependence, as the number of firms in an organizational 
field increase, the chances that interfirm linkages will improve the 
situation decrease. At this point, growth itself may become a strategy 
if it reduces the total number of linkages. The absolute level of inter­
connectedness may he decrpasen ny moves as merger and consolidation. 
Thus, the conditions under which linkages of themselves are of value to 
czlc. o i. iloii sitc vcîry 5xuu.cil.xori3.j-. 
Increasing organizational interconnectedness and environmental co--
plexity appears to be a likely forecast for cooperatives. In terms of 
the future of cooperatives, French et al. (1980:236-237) forecast the 
following: fewer, but larger local cooperatives: the same number, but 
larger centralized regional cooperatives; fewer, but larger federated 
regional cooperatives; more and larger mixed-type cooperatives; more and 
larger interregional cooperatives; and more joint ventures. If such a 
forecast is accurate, then many locally owned and managed rural coopéra-
f -  C  T.7 - i  1  1  T-> ^  
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The cooperatives that will survive may have to sacrifice a degree 
of local organizational autonomy. To a large extent, much control is 
already exercised extra-locally. The well-being of members may take 
precedence over local, grass-roots control. A rigid ideology of grass 
roots control will most likely result in the demise of the organization. 
At least in the short run, the board of directors of local cooperatives 
will chart a critical course for their organizations. 
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BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCE, RANK THE FOLLOWING FACTORS WHICH MIGHT 3E CONSIDERED BY 
MEMBERS WHEN THEY ELECT COO? DIRECTORS. (RANK FROM 1 TO 6 IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE.) 
RANK ORDER; SELECTION CRITERIA: 
Experience in Business/Financial Affairs 
Success at Farming 
Participation in Community Organizations 
Ability to Enhance Membership Confidence 
Knowledge of Marketing and Supply Channels 
Participation in Regional or State Level Organizations 
IN TODAY'S ECONOMIC. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CLIMATE, THE MOST VALUABLE ASSETS FOR THIS 
COOPERATIVE ARE .... (PLEASE RAN?: FROM 1 TO 6 IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE.) 
Political clout 
Ai'fil iati on ^ith regional cooperatives 
Mer.irership in ccop organizations (such as the Cooperative League, the 
Io%a InL^titute, etc.) 
J.rge size 
Flexibility in operations 
FOR ZACH OF TZ MANAGER 1/2 ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS LISTED BELOW. PLEAS^E JNDICATE^WHEHi 
.-- — r— , Xf'-y -rnv- 'DT'"-":' "3%' r-TDT : . ' YC 'ATK S~~7ir;-ir FOP. zJiCr. . 
\ RES?r-N.-3ILIIY LIES FRIT-y^IL: WITH: | 
i : i MOSTLY E-.'ENLY MOSTLY |
TASKS: \ BO.ARD BC.ARD LF/IDED MANAGER MA.XAGER \ 
PlA:\?:IXC--naking policy decisions for the 
ORG,-.'' 12 INC - -ratchin - work and psopl'-:^ under 
the best possible arranger?.ents 
i '  ^ r  r< '  ;  - ; • *  f ^  ^ :  i. -v  v— L v .  io—L. ^  w.  ^  
•guidance to day-to-day activities 
COC?DI''ATI>'G--con;bining United resources 
to ensure tea- wcr.-: anc unity o:' purpose 
CONTROLLING—seeing /nether established 
plans are followed and goals a ^ Uïined 
1 
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16 POSSIBLE COOPERATIVE GOALS ARE LISTED BELOW. SELECT WHAT YOU BELIEVE ABE THE FIVE 
MOST IMPORTANT GOALS FOR YOUR COOP AND PLACE THE NUMBERS OF EACH IN THE BLANKS PROVIDED. 
THEN SELECT THE LEAST IMPORTANT GOAL. 
To increase the sales volume. 
To achieve; a. "omuoLii running" operation with harmonious 
working relations and satisfied employees 
To naxinize the income of patron members. 
To obtain the best possible returns on investments. 
To maintain flexibility in operations. 
To make a satisfactory net savings each year 
To maintain present policies and practices to avoid risk. 
To achieve maximum operational efficiency. 
To serve members by providing a policing type of compe­
tition to other agribusiness firms. 
To increase the area served by this cooperative. 
To update the facilities of this cooperative. 
To maximise net savings of this cooperative. 
To provide products and service at the lowest price. 
To be a business leader in the area. 
To build a good public image for the cooperative. 
To provide product information. 
HOW OFTE:; ?C YOU C0"GULT «TH OH I'SE THE FOLLOaTNG SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN BOARD PLAN­
NING A.NT) DECISiCN-MAKING? (Circle .'lumber from 1 to 5 for each source listed below.) 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: ME'.'E? OFTE?; 
ATTORNEY 1 2 3 i; 5 
REGIONAL COOPERATIVES 1 2 3 i; 5 
EX'itNSiON SERVICE 1 2 3 - 5 
OTKEh ijr; IV .. M  ^ j 1 2 3 5 
EAM-; FOR COOPERATIVES (Farm Credit Administration) 1 2 3 c 
FAR:-IER COOPERATIVE SERVICE (ESC.;) 2 3 5 
MEMBERSHIP CONTACTS 1 2 3 
IOWA INSTITUTE OF COOPERATION % 2 3 ~ < 
DATA ATO REPORT' PROVIDED FY MANAGEME>rr 1 2 ] ; 
PERIODICALS (Wallace's Farmer, Wall Street Journal, etc.) 1 2 3 i; 5 
•  » .  '  •  I I  - .  1, .^  .  -  .  u _  ^ J.' » _ V.I 1 2 3 i; 5 
- 2 3 5 
R.ADIO OR 1 2 3 - 5 
CT.-IE?.^. ' ; V W"r.ax ? J ; 
-
2 3 5 
2 Ll c 
1 .  
MOST IMPORTANT GOAL 3. 
u. 
2nd MOST IMPORTANT 
3rd MOST IMPORTANT 
^th MOST IMPORTANT 







10 .  
11. 




1 6 .  
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TKS PROBLEMS LISTED BELOW MAY AFFECT YOU? COOP NOW AND IN THE FUTURE. INDICATE THE 
EXTENT TO WHICH EACH FACTOR IS CURRENTLY A PROBLEM BY CIRCLING A NUMBER ON A SCALE FROM 
1 TO 5. NEXT, INDICATE WHETHER YOU EXPECT EACH FACTOR TO BECOME LESS PROBLEMA.TIC (-), 






1 FUTURE j 
PROBLEM?! 
Public/consumer relations 1 2 3 4 5 0 + 
Competition from other cooperatives 1 2 3 it 5 0 4-
Competition from nor.cooperative busi nesses 1 2 3 5 0 •f 
Dominance by regional cooperatives 1 2 3 k 5 0 + 
Obtaining energy suBDlies 1 2 3 4 5 0 + 
1 2 3 4 5 — 0 
Recruiting new coop members 1 2 3 k 5 0 + 
Retaining old coop members 1 2 3 4 5 0 + 
Obtaining quality personnel 2 3 4 5 0 
1 2 3 4 — G -f-
Technological changes 1 2 3 4 5 0 + 
Urban encroachment ]_ 2 3 4 5 0 
Corporate control 0: a.^iculture 1 2 3 4 5 0 + 
National economic conditions 1 2 3 4 5 0 + 
Changes in coop enabling legislatior 1 2 3 4 5 0 + 
Availability of credit ]_ 2 3 4 5 0 
Government legislation related to . 
. . . farm price programs 1 2 3 4 5 0 •f 
. . . production controls 2 3 4 5 0 + 





ivHAT ARE THE TWC MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS CUHRENTLÏ FACT COO?? (3e specific) 
(11 
WHAT DC YOU BElir/E «IL: BE THE TWO 
}3:\T TEN YEARS? (Be as specific as 
MOST SE? 
possible 
:OUS PROB CONFRONTING YOU R GOO? IN T 
( 2 )  
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TOE NEXT PAGES CONTAIN STATEMENTS RELATED TO COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLES, DECISIONS AND 
OPERATIONS, AND RELATIONS WITH MEMBERS AND MANAGEMENT. PLEASE INDICATE WHETHER YOU 
(SA) STRONGLY AGREE, (A) AGREE, ARE (u) UNDECIDED, (D) DISAGREE, OR (SD) STRONGLY DISA­
GREE WITH EACH STATEMENT BY CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE LETTER(S) TO THE RIGHT. 
Cooperative Principles 
1. Cooperatives should function according to the traditional SA A U D SD 
principles of cooperation. 
2. A cooperative's first responsibility is to make as much SA A U D SD 
profit as possible. 
3. All things considered, there is really not nuch differ- SA A U D SD 
ence between cooperatives and competing noncooperatives. 
il-. More emphasis should be placed on growth of a cooperative SA A U D SD 
than on service to members. 
5- Cooperatives must engage in both supply and marketing in SA A U Q SD 
order to survive in today's economic environment. 
6. Public relations activities and responsibilities are as SA A U D SD 
necessary for cooperatives as for profit type businesses. 
7. Cooperative members should be given the same treatment SA A U D SD 
regajrdless of their volume of patronage. 
3. The bigger a cooperative gets, the less responsive it is SA A U D SD 
to members' needs. 
9. As cooperatives increase in size, they become less respon- SA A U D SD 
sive to members from smaller farms. 
10. Small scale farmers don't really benefit cooperatives. SA A U D SD 
11. Larger farm operations benefit more from cooperatives SA. A u D SD 
than smaller ones. 
12. Larger members contribute mere to the success of this SA A U D SD 
cooperative than ."mall members. 
13. Any qualified person should be eligible for directorship SA A U D SD 
whether he/she : s a farmer or not. 
It. A director should not be allowed to serve consecutive terms. SA A U D SD 
15. Tnere should be a limit on the number of terr.s a person SA A u D 3D 
can ser'/e as a director. 
16. Members should have some special skill or kno-ledge to SA. A U D SD 
nominated for a directorship. 
17. Knowledge about business is more important for successf'ul SA A U D SD 
directorship than knowledge about farming. 
18. It is absolutely essential for a cooperative to nave 3A A U D SD 
strong central management. 
19- It is not as important for directors to have knowledge SA A U D SD 
about business as for .'managers. 
•.c';]d be held more responsible for cooperative SA A U D SD 
formance than the board. 
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Cooperative Decision Making 
1. Board meetings very often involve debate on issues 
viewed differently by the board and management. 
2. Boairds should make all important final decisions, not 
management. 
3. This board has considerable knowledge about the coopera­
tive's strengths and weaknscoEO. 
4. This board rarely ever changes or modifies management's 
decisions or proposals. 
5. This board is always in control of the cooperative. 
6. Directors of this cooperative represent a wide diversity 
of business experience. 
7. This board bases its appraisal of cooperative affairs 
largely on data and reports provided by manage-ent. 
8. It is a general policy of this board to refer major 
issues to members before making a final decision. 
9. My views sometimes conflict with the board as a whole. 
10. The only time this board makes an imuortan'u decision is 
during a crisis. 
11. Board meetings are usually smooth and harmonious. 
12. Most directors of this cooperative do not raise questions 
concerning issues which they do not understand. 
13. Most directors of this cooperative work hard to stay well 
informed about the operations of the cooperative. 
14. Î always voice my opinions at board meetings even if they 
are not popular wit!: other board members. 
15. Most directors of this cooperative take an active part 
in introducing new ideas. 
16. This board is unanimous on nearly all decisions. 
L>. Coniliu Ling, .i^"G and cpir.icr.c chcuîd 'r" 3. 
meetings. 
IS. Disagreement and differences of opinion among board membe 
nay result in better decisions for tne cooperative. 
19. Board members with similar interests and beliefs help 
the cooperative to operate more effectively. 
Relations •••••ith Mana.-eaent and Members 
1. This board has complete confidence in its ;na.iagei-ent. 
2. There is an open atmosphere of mutual consultation be twee 
management and the board in this coopera-ive. 
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3. It would be quite difficult for this "board to discharge SA A U D SD 
a manager who has not performed well. 
k. This board gives management support even on ideas on SA A U D SD 
which there is disagreement. 
5. in this cooperative there is a great deal of informality SA A U D SD 
between management and the board. 
6. In this cooperative, management and board desire to work SA A U 5 SID 
together but have fundamental differences on how to 
achieve a common 
7. Most directors of this cooperative tend to get more SA A U D SD 
friendly than is necessary with management. 
8. This board does not review member complaints since this SA A 'J D SD 
is strictly a management matter. 
9. .'.ll members should be able to submit their complaints SA A U D SD 
directly to the board without going through management. 
10. Most directors of this cooperative try to discuss coopéra- SA A U D SD 
tive affairs informally with individual members. 
THE NEXT QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT CONDITIONS AFFECTING PUNNING AND DECISION-MAKING. PLEASE 
INDICATE HOW OFTEN THESE CONDITIONS ARE EXPERIENCED BY CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER 
ON A SCALE FROM 1 to 5 TO THE RIGHT OF EACH QUESTION. 
NEVER OFTEN 
1. How often arc there changes in the social, economic 
and political conditions outside your cooperative 
which directly affect board decisions? 
2. How often do you believe that the information you 
have about the factors outside your cooperative 
is sufficient for decjsion-ma>.ing? 
3. How often do you need to gather information from 
some person or organisation outside your cooperative 
in order to make a decision? 
Li. ^ H 0*"^  A rt  ^^ 
of board decisions? 
5. How often are the plans made by the board affeotcd 
by changes in government policies and regulations? 
6. How often are the plans made by the board affected 
by lack of knowledge of competitors' actions? 
7. How often are board plans affected by rapid and 
unpredictable change in the farm economy? 
S. How often are board plans affected by rapid and 
unpredictable change in tne general economy? 
i'.ow often ar? i..'ard i-'olsions affected by naving 
too much information -ha- must b^ oonsid'^r'^d? 
:0. How often arc beard decisions affec^ea by inputs 
from coop members? 
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Attitudes toward Agriculture, Politics,and Conununity and Public Relations 
1. Most public officeholders are somewhat familiar with SA A 
cooperatives and usually support them with their votes. 
2. Cooperatives should have political action committees. SA A 
3. Most people have very little knowledge about the role that SA A 
cooperatives play in the agricultural economy. 
U-. Cooperatives represent enough voters to make political SA A 
action committees unnecessary at any level of government. 
5. Most people in this community support this cooperative. SA A 
6. An individual farmer can usually make better farm manage- SA A 
ment decisions than a group of farmers or some agency. 
7. The solution of the agricultural problem is going to depend SA A 
upon each farmer giving up a part of his indepondcncc. 
8. Farmers must stick together in order to get things done even SA A 
if they have to give up some of their individual freedom. 
9. A basic cause of the agricultural problem today is that too SA A 
many farmers go their separate waj-s without regard for 
other farmers. 
10. Most local people are unaware of the contribution this SA A 
cooperative makes to the local community. 
Attitudes toward Director Liability 
1. The legal standards imposed on directors are generally not SA A 
spelled out in the statutes, but arc established by court 
decisions. 
2. Courts may hold directors personally liable for actions SA A 
taken by management under power delegated to them by the 
board. 
3. Failure to attend board meetings would not be considered SA A 
Notice of special meetings ne^d not be given to directors. SA A 
5 • A majority of the directors have the right to remove one SA A 
of their own members. 
6. All securities laws place personal responsibility and SA A 
liability on the directors if there are violations of the 
?. Directors may be held liable for failing to obtain from SA 
their treasurer a statement of the financial condition 
of the cooperative at each meeting. 
8. Directors, so long as they act in good faith, are not pre- SA ; 
eluded from engaging in a business similar to that ceurried 
100 
THIS PAGE CONTAINS QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE AS A DIRECTOR AND BACKGROUND QUES­
TIONS FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES. 
1. For how many years have you ser/ed as a director of this coop? years 
2. What is the length of a. term on your cooperative board? years 
3. For how many years have you been a member of this cooperative? years 
•r. '«"nat is your present age? years 
5. Are you currently a board ncmber in another coop? (Circle number) 
1 yes 
2 NO ^ If NO, have you ever been a board member in another 
cooperative? (Circle number) 
1 KG 
2 YES ^ If YES, in how many different coops? 
6. In which of the following; types of director training have you participated? 
(Circle numbers of all that apply) 
1 '.'ORKSHOPS OR SHORT COURSES AT LOCAL LS"/EL 
2 WORKSHOP? OR SHORT COURSES AT REGIONAL OR STATE LF/EL 
3 ORIENTATION PROGRAM FOR NSW DIRECTORS 
h ZCPERIENCE A3 JUNIOR BOARD MEMBER 
5 SOME OTHER FORM OF DIRECTOR TRAINING (What?): 
7. What is your primary occupation? (Circle number) 
1 FARMING 
2 COOPERATIVE MANAGER 
3 MANAGER OF OTHER BUSINESS 
^ OTHER OCCUPATION (Wnat?): 
8. If you farm, please answer the following questions; 
NJXP.EP OF ACRES OPERATED: 
TOTAL YEARS FARMING EXPERIENCE: 
PROPORTION OF TOTAT, >ÔT H^COME FROM F.ARMING (Circle number below); 
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To which of these farm orj^nisations do you belong? (Circle all numbers that apply) 
1 IOWA FARM BUREAU FEDERATION 
2 IOWA FARMERS UNION 
3 IOWA GRANGE 
4 NATIONAL FARMERS ORGANIZATION 
5 OTHER GENERAL FARM ORGANIZATION (What?): 
10. To which of the following farm commodity organizations do you belc 
numbers that apply.) 
1 IOWA DAIRY ASSOCIATION 6 
2 IOWA CATTLEMEN'S ASSN. 7 
3 IOWA PORK PRODUCERS ASSN. 8 
IOWA SOYBEAN ASSOCIATION 9 
5 IOWA POULTRY ASSOCIATION 
IOWA TURKEY FEDERATION 
IOWA CORN GROWERS ASSOCIA.TION 
IOWA STATE VEGST.A3LE GROWERS ASSN. 
OTHER COMMODITY ASSOCIATION(S) (What?): 
11. Are you currently a board member in any organization other than a coop? (Circle 
number) 
1 YES 
2 NO ^ If NO, have you ever been a board member in any organization 
other than a coop? (Circle number) 
1 NO 
2 YES ^ If YES, in how many 
different organizations? 
12. Have you ever or do you now hold a management position in another organization, 
otner than your own farming operation? (Circle number) 
1 NO 
2 Y3S 
13. To how many different cooperatives do you currently bêlons? 
1^. What is the highest level of formal education that you have completed? (Circle 
number) 
1 LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GH-^^UATE 
2 HIGH SCKOO'. GRADUATE 
3 SOME COLLEGE 
c COLLEGE GRADUATE 
15. To how many local (nonagricultural) organizations do you belong? (include civic, 
political, educational, social, and fraternal organizations) 
ozgcJii zs. uions 
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SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE IOWA INSTITUTE OF COOPERATION, ITS ACTIVI­
TIES, AND FUTURE PROGRAMS AND SERVICES ARE LISTED BELOW. 
1. Please rank the three program areas of the Iowa Institute listed below according to 
the value of each for your cooperative. Assign the number 1 to the most valuable 
activity, 2 to the second most valuable, anû 3 to tne tnird most valuable activity. 
EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES FOB KEffîERS, MANAGERS. AMD DIRECTORS 
PUBLIC RELATIONS ACTIVITIES 
LEGISLATIVE AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION ACTIVITIES 
?. Some services provided and activities performed by the Iowa Institute are listed 
In the space provided, please rate each activity or service on a scale from 1 to 5 
according to its value to your cooperative by circling the appropriate number. 
Activity or Service: 
NOVEMBER ANNUAL MEETING 
SEPTHMBER DISTRICT MEETING 
WINTER MANAGER/DIRECTOR WORKSHOP 
GO OP-A-GRAM A;VD LEGISLATIVE BULLETIN 
COLLECTION OF COOPERATIVE LITERArJRE 
ANNUAL COO? MONTH PROMOTION 
YOUTH PROGRAMS 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION (NATIONAL LF.'EL) 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION (STATE LE".'SL) 
3- For oach of the following otatementc about the Iowa Institute, indicate whether 
you ( S A )  Strongly Agree, (A) Ar—re, are (U) Undecided, (D) Disagree or (SD) Strongly 
Disagree by eirclingr the appropri.ite response to the right of the statement. 
1: yi' 
? sr 
c. Nonmember coops benefit as much from the activities SA A U P SD 
of the Iowa Institute as do member cooperatives. 
Hc" would you rate the overall performance of the leva Institute? ^Circle number) 
1 scet.let 
? GOOD 
; FA 2? 
POOR 
Less More 
Valuable V aluable 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 'j 
1 2 3 5 
1 2 3 c; 
1 2 3 5 
1 ?. 3 5 
1 2 3 - 5 
1 2 3 < 
1 2 3 c 
a. Membership in the Iowa Institute create: a more 
stable and predictable environment for this coop. 
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PLEASE FEEL FREE TO ADD ANY ADDITIONAL COMMENTS IN THE SPACE PROVIDED EELOW. WE'RE 
INTERESTED IN YOUR OPINIONS ABOUT THE TOPICS COVERED IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE AS WELL AS 
COOPERATIVE AFFAIRS AND ISSUES IN GENERAL. 
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appendix b 
TJilC mLIX^WINC ARE CENEl^AL QUESTIONS ABOU'i' YOU M COOPERATIVE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE EXACT ANSV/ERS, PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR BEST 
ESTIMTE. IF SOME QUEvSTEONS ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO YOUR TYPE OF COOPERATIVE, PLEASE INDICATE THIS. 
1. In whci.'b year was this coopérabivci fj.r-st incorporated? 
2. In wha.t year wore you hired? 
3. V/ha.t vfas the total annual, dollar volume of buciness during the last completed fiscal year? 
'1. Approximately what percenUige of business was conducted with nonmembers? 
5. Uliat is the ioi;al number of membcTs that belong to this cooperative? 
6. ])ooG I,hi G cooperative have branch facilii/Los? (Circle number) 
1 NO 
2 Y'%) V If YES, how many? 
How were they cic^uired? (Circle all numbers that apply); 
1 PURCHASE OF EXISTING FACILITIES 
2 MERGE,'R WITH ANOTHER ORGANIZATION 
3 CONSOLIDATION ^ 
4 CONSTRUCG.lOU BY COOPERATIVE ^ 
5 RENTED 
6 SOME OTHER WAY (How?): 
7. Willi which of the following community orgini'zations, regional cooperatives, and cooperative organizations does this 
coo])erative liave membership) or business affiliation? (Circle all numbers that apply) 
] MLDI^ND 9 IOWA GRAIN AND FEED ASSOCIATION 
2 FARMLAND (I'^ARM ARCO) 10 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OR COMMERCIAL CLUB 
3 L\ND 0'TAKES 11 IOWA ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES 
4' UNITED PURCHASERS 12 IOWA PETROLBIUM DEALERS ASSOCIATION 
5 BOONE VALLEY 13 IOWA INSTITUTE OF COOPERATION 
6 AGRI-INDUSIKIES (FGDA) 14 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF COOPERATION 
? COOPERATIVE LEAGUE 15 IOWA CHEMICAL AND FERTILIZER ASSOCIATION 
8 BANK FOR COOPER/iTIVES 16 OTHER(S) (List below): 
(Qlestions continue on reverse) 
0. I)oo;3 your cooperative have a nominating conunittee for board elections? (Circle number) 
1 NO 
YES — 
[f NO, go on to Question 9 
—> If YES, ansK3r 8a and 8b 
1101/ 13 THIS GOMMIITI® SELl^GTIilD? (Circle number) b. V/HO SERVES ON THIS COMMITTEE? (Circle all that apply) 
1 APPOINTE]) BY IDAtlD 
2 ELliXJTlïD ]3Y MEMBERS 
3 APPOINTE]) BY MAN/iGEI? 




4 OTHER (Who?): 
9. Next, wo iieed infoi-ination on ;ill boai'd co nmittees which vfere in existence on July 1, 1979' Balow please provide 
(l) the name oi' each conmltt(5(3; (2) the y^a.r it was established; (3) a brief statement of its purpose; and (4) the 
organi i.atlons and/or occupations repi-osenbed by any committee members who are not also members of your cooperative, 
YEAR COMMITTEE ORGANIZATIQiNfS AND/OR OCCUPATIONS 
COMM LTTICE NAME ESTABLI ^HED PURPOSE REPRESENTED BY NON-COOP MEMBERS 




(]:A other:;, ])lcase list on a separate sheet of pciper) 
10. How many other coo]3erative businessies vrLbh similar major product 
!l.ines o;o mc'irkoting commodities are operating in your trade area? 
11. 1-Iovf many othei: independent businesses with similar major product 
lines or m/irkoting commodities are operating in your trade area? 
12. I:n the :last five years, has the number of organizations competing for your members' business . . . (circle number) 
]. JNCRIC'.SED 
?. REMAIMED ABOUT TIOC SAME 
3 DECREASED 
IP., the last five years, has the level oJ' competition in your trade area . . . (circle number;) 
]. INCRiy.SED 
2 RBIMAD^IED ABOUT TlOi] SAME 
3 dkire^.slîd 
13. V/l'iich oJ' the following]: Imsiness professionals and consultants have been employed by the boai'd during the last 




3 BUSlNJiSS MANACEMEN'I' CONSULTANT 
INVES'IMENT CONSULTANT 
5 BUILDING CONSULI'ANT 
6 OTHER BUSINESS PROPESSIONAL(S) (Please specify): 
I'l-. Has your cooperative been part of a merg:er or consolidation in the past 10 years? (Circle number) 
1 NO 
ye3 
15. Ill tti3 past 10 years, has membeirship in l.his cooperative . . . (circle number) 
:L INCREASED 
2 REMAINED ABOUT THIÎI SAME 
3 DECREASED 
(Quecticins continue on reverse) 
l6. IkiB this, cooperative faced any product shortages during the last five years? (Circle numbei-) 
]. NO 
% YEo —^ If YES, how did the coop deal with the shortage(s)? (Circle thf; numbers of all that 
apply) 
1 JîOUGiîT ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS 
2 (ÎUSTOMHR RATIONING ACCORDING TO PREVIOUS PURCHASES 
3 CUSTOMER RATIONING ACCORDING TO S]ZE OF FARM 
4 SPREAD OIT USE OF PRODUGT(S) DURING THE DAY 
5 SOLD PROLUCT(S) IN SHORT SUPPLY TO COOPERATIVE MEMBERS ONLY 
6 1îaised pr]:ces of produgt(s) in short supply 
7 OTOEfJ V/AV(S) (Please list in space provided below) s  





18. Does your coopérabive :ia,ve a formal, ostc.blished procedure for communicating vfith members? (Circle number) 
1 no 
YES 








îoWCl -StfltC University of science and Technolof^v Ames. Iowa 50011 
Department of Sociology and Anthropol 
303 East Hall 
June 14, 1979 
Dear Board Member: 
As we approach the 1980s, directors of rural cooperatives are facing 
complex decision-making situations because of rapid change in the farm and 
nonfarm sectors of our economy. We believe that the boards of directors will 
play a vital role in assuring the long term survival of their coops. Despite 
the numerous and diverse responsibilities delegated to the directors of rural 
Iowa cooperatives, we know little about their beliefs and attitudes. In an 
effort to learn more about directors and how they view the changes facing their 
coops, we are undertaking a study of boards of directors in cooperation with 
the Iowa Institute of Cooperation. 
As a major part of this study, questionnaires are being distributed to 
the board members of a sample of 127 Iowa cooperatives. Your cooperative was 
among those selected from a list provided by the Iowa Institute of Cooperation. 
Each of the directors of your cooperative has been invited to participate in 
the study. Your decision to participate is voluntary. However, in order that 
the results will be truly representative, it is important that we receive 
responses from each individual in the sample. 
We encourage you to complete the questionnaire. It should take approxi-
"2%^ ^ AC ui H OT-i ^ 2."^ 2 ^  ^ ! ri i f- lortCTTnTvTQ*^ pnn mp"i. ) i Ti Tinti 
enclosed return envelop as soon as possible. Be assured that your responses 
will be treated confidentially. Your name will not be placed on the question­
naire and the data will never be released in any way that would identify indivi­
duals. The identification number on the questionnaire is necessary^ so that we 
can check your name off the mailing list when your questionnaire is returned. 
We appreciate your assistance. Your diligence in completing the ques­
tionnaire is vital to the success of this research. If vou have anv questions. 
/ooy,_a/,ai 
or Ms. Betty Wells, Graduate R.esearch Assistant (294-1481). 
Sincerely yours. 
/.... 




loWfl Stfltc LlmVCrSlt^  of science and Tec, hnolo^y |||s Ames. Iowa 50011 
.1, ,1 on T 070 
Department of Sociology and Anthropoli 
303 East Hall 
Telephone: 515-294-6481 
Dear Coop Manager: 
We have recently init iated a study of boards of directors of a sample 
of Iowa cooperatives. Your cooperative was among those selected from a 
l ist provided by the Iowa Insti tute of Cooperation. Each of the directors 
of your coop has been invited to part icipate in the study and has received 
4-/-\ r\ rr-i 1 y-\ 4- 3 /4 v%o+ijv-^ Q y ucb uiV/iiitQiiC V w i c uC Qiiu i c u u : n . 
There were a number of questions which we did not ask the directors 
because of l imited space on the questionnaire and the redundancy involved 
in acquiring identical answers from each director. However, these answers 
are iiceutru i ur uiic buuucb:) i u i uump i c u i ui i u i uiic rsLuuy. il wuuiu uc a y t ca t 
help i f  you would provide this infomation by completing and returning the 
enclosed information sheet. 
The form should take only a few minutes to complete. In cases where 
you do not have exact answers, please provide your best estimate. When 
f inished, please fold and mail in the enclosed return envelope. 
Your part icipation is voluntary. However, your answers are essential 
i f  the results of the study are to truly represent Iowa coops. Be assured 
of the complete confidential i ty of your answers. The data obtained from 
the study wil l  not be used in any way that would identify individuals or 
+ T K^i  i r r t  4-  Ls  <— f -  T» \  -K1-% 4-LAUIVC.O.  I I IV_ I  :  :  V I  I  IUUL. IUI I  McmiuCl  WM u i  1 C  iw i in  1 O i iCv-COOUi  y O 'U UIJUU 
we can check your cooperative off the mail ing l ist when the form is 
returned. 
We appreciate your assistance. I f  you have any questions, please 
contact Dr. John L. Tait, Extension Sociologist [294-6481] or Ms. Betty 
Wells, Graduate Research Assistant (294-1481). 
Sincerely yours, 
John L. : a i t  
Extension Sociologist and 
Professor of Sociology 




îoW'fl -StCîtC LluiVCrSltlj of Science and Technology 
M 
fil 
July 25, 1979 
Ames. lowa 50011 
Department of Sociology and Anthropolo 
303 Hast Hall 
Telephone; 5I5-294-64K1 
Dear Board Member: 
About a month ago, we wrote to you seeking your opinion on a number of 
cooperative issues and about your role and responsibi l i t ies as a director of 
a rural Iowa cooperative. As of today, we have not yet received your completed 
questionnaire. 
We undertook this study because we believe that directors serve a vital 
role in insuring the effectiveness of their cooperatives and that there is a 
-i- --V »—> XS YX I , 4-  ^I"» ^  1 ^ ^ ry ^  I  ICC U LU I Ca  l i t  i i i v  :  C  auL/u  u  UIIC O U V :  V  J  UC CJ J uc  :  i  C  I u  11  u  luCi iO I u i  I  C  iMsj i* .N- io .v* iO 
who formulate policy and set cooperative directions. He are writ ing to you 
again because of the signif icance of each questionnaire to the usefulness of 
the study. For the results of the study to represent the opinions of al l  the 
directors of member coops of the Iowa Insti tute of Cooperation, each person 
in the sample must complete and return the questionnaire. The accuracy and 
usefulness of the study results therefore depend on you and others who have 
not yet responded. 
We realize that you have numerous demands on your t ime, but we believe 
that the results of the study wil l  be both informative and useful. Of course, 
your part icipation in the study is voluntary. However, we encourage you to 
4» N MI /-* f /-X I I 4- N I I +»  ^  ^  ^ R». 1 ^ N 3 V*/-\ I f 3 C A \ / : t L.UT\c  u i iC u  I  n ic  vuuwuu «-»v j  I  :  I  I  :  L« vC /  v  w v^u i i iu icuc u:  :  C ywcou iw i i i i v i i  i  j . i i  \w,  w  ^  
have misplaced or did not receive the original questionnaire, a duplicate is 
enclosed together with a return, postage paid envelope. 
Again, be assured that your responses wil l  be treated vj i th complete con­
f idential i ty. I f  you have any questions, please contact Dr. John L. Tait 
(address and telephone above) or Ms. Bettv L. Wells, Research Associate 
(294-8368) .  
Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely yours,  
'f , OUIIÎI  L  .  1 C  i  U  
Extension Sociolocist and 
D "Fo Ç C r>-P 
•  I  \J ' w'w'V— 
/ / ' 
^ /\ --~—r . , a/ / / j .•> ,• 
3etty L. Wei Is 
Research Associate 
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loWfl StCltC l_JuiV6rSltlj of Science and Technolo^ Ames. Iowa 5001 ! 
Department of Sociology and Anthropoloj 
103 East Hall 
Augus C /.J, -L? / ? 1 eiephone: 515-294-6480 
Dear Coop Manager: 
About a month ago we wrote to you asking you to provide information about 
your cooperative to supplement our study of boards of directors of Iowa 
cooperatives. We have not yet received your completed information sheet. 
The response by the managers of the cooperatives included in our sample is 
very encouraging. But, the accuracy of our profile of boards of directors 
now depends on you and the other managers who have not yet responded. The 
background data which you would provide is critical to our statistical 
analysis. 
If you have misplaced or did not receive the original information sheet, 
a duplicate is enclosed. We encourage you to complete it and return in 
the enclosed postage paid envelope. Be assured that the information 
that you provide will be treated with complete confidentiality. Individual 
respondents or cooperatives will never be identified. The identification 
number on the information sheet allows us to keep track of the questionnaires 
that have been returned. 
We appreciate your assistance. Your answers are essential to the success 
of our study. If you have any questions please contact Dr. John L. Tait, 
(294-8368) 
.  1  / "on/ .  4- , ,  T.7^  1  1  fs 
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